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Abstract 
This study explores the relationship between internet communication and democratization, 
through the notion of the public sphere. It presents a case study of the 2006 Kuwaiti reform 
movement “The Orange Movement”, and its use of the internet. On this basis, the author 
argues that during 2006, the internet constituted a public sphere for Kuwaitis, in which to 
convey unfiltered news, discuss, agitate, expose corruption, mobilize, and more. The 
protagonists could engage each other in ways impossible offline, and their efforts affected the 
Kuwaiti reality, enhancing the participatory aspect of Kuwait‟s democratic project. Moreover, 
it suggests that in Kuwait, public opinion can be formed and acted upon, independently of the 
state and the political elite. Yet, this study also takes care to highlight the limitations of the 
internet with regards to democratization. Though it argues that the internet may be an 
important tool, it is not sufficient in itself as a democratizing force. For the Orange Movement 
of 2006, the internet was not a public sphere; it was a tool mediating their debate, and a place 
locating it. The rest – the content - is still up to each and everyone.  
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A note on transliteration and translation 
Throughout this thesis, I have followed the same system for transliteration as used by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, please refer to “University of Oslo” in the list of 
references. I have done so with all Arabic names from Arabic sources. However, with regards 
to the names of Arabic authors writing in English, where the authors themselves provide a 
transliteration of their name, I have used this in stead. 
With regards to translation of quotations from blogs, newspapers and other Arabic sources, I 
do not provide a transliteration of the original quote in general. However, in the case of 
ambiguous quotes, I provide a transliteration in the footnotes.  Moreover, with regards to 
terms, expressions and slogans used repeatedly in Kuwait and/or by the Orange Movement, I 
provide a transliteration of these as well. Lastly, I do not provide a transliteration of Arabic 
words which are generally known and used in English, such as “Emir”.  
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1 Introduction 
 
“Invent the printing press and democracy is inevitable”  
(Thomas Carlyle, Sartor resartus
1
).  
During the summer of 2006, the Gulf state of Kuwait witnessed some rather intriguing events. 
Its established political scene was shaken by the appearance of what came to be known as 
“The Orange Movement” (al-Ḥaraka al-Burtuqāliyya), or “We want five” (nabīhā khamsa2), a 
popular movement campaigning for political reform. Led by young Kuwaitis, the movement 
campaigned for a reduction of the number of electoral districts from 25 to five. Trivial as it 
may seem, the issue was controversial in Kuwait. Nevertheless, the movement firmly believed 
it would enhance the state‟s democratic project. In just three short months, they managed to 
get the country‟s attention, to rally large crowds to their demonstrations and to secure the 
support of many established politicians. On July 17
th
, their struggle ended in victory; the 
Kuwaiti parliament voted to change the number of electoral districts to five.  
Though it would be hard to establish that the Orange Movement singlehandedly brought 
about electoral reform in Kuwait, it seems – at the very least - that they made any other 
outcome far less likely, as I will discuss in this thesis. In doing so, the OM
3
 was both 
important and unprecedented in the Kuwaiti context. The question is then, what made the 
Orange Movement successful, what did they do?  
The Kuwaiti Orange Movement of 2006 was a loosely defined popular movement, united in 
the cause for electoral reform. The majority of its activists were young Kuwaitis, many from a 
liberal ideological background. A quick look at their campaign reveals the use of many 
                                                 
1
 As referred to in Dewey (1927): 110 
2
 This slogan presents a bit of a mystery on part of the Kuwaiti dialect. Without exceptions, the OM both 
pronounced and wrote the slogan “nabīhā khamsa”. However, this does not make much sense in Arabic, as 
the verb as written here, nabī, is rather meaningless, given that “na” is a prefix for the verb conjugated to the 
first person plural. As far as I have gathered, the actual verb used is baghā, that is, to seek or desire. This is 
the translation given by the OM activists as well. As to why the letter ghayn is omitted both in speech and 
writing in Kuwait, I have found no answer. Moreover, in some instances, ”ham” is added at the beginning of 
the slogan, fully vocalized. However, ”ham” does not make sense in Modern Standard Arabic, and I have 
found no explanation as to what this term might mean in Kuwaiti dialect.  
3
 The nature of this thesis naturally dictates that the term ”The Orange Movement” will be used quite a lot, and 
for the sake of simplicity, I often use the abbreviation ”The OM”. Yet, I sometimes use the term in its entirety 
as well, for the sake of variation. 
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innovative campaign tactics, as well as an extensive use of the internet
4
. Through blogs, 
forums, YouTube and a campaign site, the protagonists/participants discussed, conveyed 
news, documented their rallies, presented their arguments, instigated action and more.  
If we consider that the number of internet users in the Middle East has increased by over 1675 
%
5
 over the last nine years, the OMs online activities deserve our attention. What does it 
mean that the Orange Movement made use of the internet in their campaign? Did the web 
bring forth new possibilities in terms of political activism? Can the internet contribute to 
democratization? With the number of users sharply increasing, and much attention being paid 
to its possible effects for democracy, I believe it is imperative to explore these questions. That 
is, to study the use of the internet for political purposes, and to identify its actual 
contributions. Though Carlyle‟s quote above may seem rather ridiculous today, the same kind 
of technological determinism has been expressed on part of the internet, as I will discuss 
below. Obviously, reality is not that simple. Thus, in the following, I present a study of the 
use and possible contributions of the internet in the campaign of the Kuwaiti Orange 
Movement of 2006.  
1.1 The internet and democratization 
“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and 
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer”. 
(US Supreme Court in Reno v. UCLA
6
) 
As we can read from the quote above, Thomas Carlyle does not stand alone in history when it 
comes to optimistic views on new technology. This infamous opinion from the US Supreme 
Court may be characteristic of the near deterministic view on the democratizing effects of the 
internet that some expressed in the nineties, but has since been heavily criticized. And 
rightfully so. Examples from for instance Egypt, Saudi Arabia and China show that the 
internet in itself is no guarantee of free speech; bloggers have been arrested, and content has 
                                                 
4
 In term with what Anette Markham refers to as ”current trends in internet studies”, I have chosen to spell 
”internet” with a lower case i. As Baym and Markham points out, spelling ”internet” with a capital I grants it 
”agency and power that are better granted to those who develop and use it”. Baym & Markham (2009): vii. 
5
 Internet Usage and World Stats (2008) 
6
 US Supreme Court (1997) 
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been censored
7
. And access to the internet is far from universal; as of 2008, only 23.44 % of 
the world‟s population was online8. In addition, there‟s the issue of what people actually do 
online; I find it very difficult to accept that we should assume a priori that people necessarily 
will start campaigns for democracy once they‟re given the technical ability to do so, and not, 
say, watch online movies, shop online or visit dating sites. Moreover, we have what Yochai 
Benkler referres to as the “Babel objection”: “(…)when everyone can speak, no one can be 
heard, and we devolve either to a cacophony or to the reemergence of money as the 
distinguishing factor between statements that are heard and those that wallow in obscurity”9. 
However, even though the optimism of the nineties may seem overdone, this does not mean 
that the internet cannot be an important tool for democratization.  Though Egyptian bloggers 
have been subject to government harassment, they have achieved considerable success as 
well
10. Or as Benkler puts it; “ (…) (The internet) does make the work of authoritarian 
regimes harder”11. And while internet access is nowhere near universal, there has been a 
growth in users worldwide of 380,3 % over the last nine years, with the biggest increase 
taking place in Africa and the Middle East
12. As for the “Babel objection”, Benkler argues 
that through mechanisms of peer-review and topicality-based linking, the problems of both 
“information overload” and “discourse fragmentation” are being solved13.  
As we have seen, one might argue that the internet is not necessarily a democratizing force in 
itself. But on the other hand, it might very well be a useful tool. This underlines two important 
points. For one thing, we should be careful with general conclusions; properly contextualized 
case studies seem to be better suited for determining any democratizing effects of the internet. 
As Robert Stake points out, “(…) case studies are of value in refining theory, suggesting 
complexities for further investigation as well as helping to establish the limits of 
generalizability”14. 
 Secondly; we must pay attention to which features provided by the internet we are talking 
about, not just point to “the internet” as such. If the internet indeed is a useful tool for 
democratization, what does it provide? What has the internet brought with it that was not in 
                                                 
7
 See for instance Lynch (2007): 9 
8
 International Telecommunication Union (2008a) 
9
 Benkler (2006): 10 
10
 See for instance Lynch (2007): 12 
11
 Benkler (2006): 271 
12
 Internet Usage and World Stats (2008) 
13
 Benkler (2006): 212 - 272 
14
 Stake (2005): 460 
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place before? This leads us to what Tim O`Reilly refers to as “Web 2.0”, and its user 
generated contents.  
1.1.1 Web 2.0 – user generated content 
Web 2.0 is not a system, program or anything clearly defined. Rather, it is a concept, which 
O`Reilly seeks to explain in his article “What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business 
Models for the Next Generation of Software”. At the core of it we find the writeable web, 
which facilitates user generated content. This is connected to what O`Reilly deems one 
another central principle of Web 2.0, which is the development of the web as a platform. In it, 
there is an “implicit “architecture of participation””, and the service providers should act as 
“intelligent brokers” of internet users, or providing “a context in which (…) user activity can 
happen”15. Other important features are the “harnessing of collective intelligence”, and the 
fact that “the service automatically gets better the more people use it”16. This could mean 
both that users participate directly in the development of sites and services, such as 
Wordpress and different open source projects like Linux and Open Office, or that users 
provide the content for a service, such as YouTube, discussion forums and blogs. 
 
As for blogs, web 2.0 has provided other important innovations as well, especially the RSS-
feed, the Trackbacks and the Permalink
17
. RSS is a technology that allows users to subscribe 
to a site, being notified every time it changes. This could be used with respects to both blog 
entries, as well as comments to a blog entry, allowing users take part in every bit of the debate 
without being physically present at any location of such a debate. This combined with the 
permalink, which provides stable links to each individual blog entry, and trackbacks, which 
informs users whenever someone else have linked to their site(s), it becomes easy for users to 
discuss each other‟s posts, comments, answer back to comments on their own posts and so on.  
 
In addition, and related to the “Babel objection” mentioned above, O`Reilly argues that: 
If it were merely an amplifier, blogging would be uninteresting. But like Wikipedia, blogging 
harnesses collective intelligence as a kind of filter. What James Suriowecki calls “The wisdom 
of the crowds” comes into play, and much as PageRank produces better results than analysis of 
any individual document, the collective attention of the blogosphere selects for value. (…) The 
                                                 
15
 O`Reilly (2007): 22 
16
 O`Reilly (2007): 22 
17
 O`Reilly (2007) 25 - 26 
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world of Web 2.0 is also the world of what Dan Gillmor calls “we, the media”, a world in which 
“the former audience”, not a few people in a back room, decides what‟s important18 
 
In sum, what we see is that Web 2.0 has provided the tools for an online public sphere. 
Internet users can easily express their opinion, discuss, comment on articles, document events 
etc. And with the numerous free blog hosts, forums, YouTube and other sites that exists, the 
places – or, if you will, the online coffeehouses - are there as well. As Benkler argues: “(…) 
The network allows all citizens to change their relationship to the public sphere. They no 
longer need be consumers and passive spectators. (…) It is in this sense that the Internet 
democratizes”19. 
1.1.2 A public sphere? 
Indeed, examining the political use of the internet through the notion of the public sphere 
seems fruitful. Papacharissi, when discussing whether the internet could revolutionize the 
political sphere, poses the following question: “Will these technologies extend our political 
capacities or limit democracy – or alternatively, do a little bit of both? Such a discussion 
should be informed primarily with an examination of the notion of the public sphere and the 
ideological discourse that accompanies it”20. Mark Poster makes the statement that “The age 
of the public sphere as face-to-face talk is clearly over: the question of democracy must 
henceforth take into account new forms of electronically mediated discourse”21.  In other 
words, it seems that not only is the notion of the public sphere a good approach to study any 
democratizing effects of the internet, but the internet is also a good venue for studying the 
development of the public sphere.  
 
Yet, why I have chosen to study the OM through the notion of the public sphere is still a valid 
question. There are for instance many interesting aspects of the movement which could be 
illuminated through social movement theory; how the movement notoriously separated 
between “us” and “them”, how they used video to share and re-live experiences, and so on. 
However, I believe all this was made possible thanks to what I deem a new online public. 
Their use of the internet made possible unrestricted discussion across social and gender 
barriers. It gave them an audience big enough to be relevant, and thus hard to overlook. 
                                                 
18
 O`Reilly (2007): 26 - 27 
19
 Benkler (2006): 272 
20
 Papacharissi (2002): 10 
21
 Poster (1995) 
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Indeed, if this was the case, it may indicate that people who did not have the status to make it 
to the front pages of newspapers still could make their voice heard, adding a new dimension 
to Kuwaiti politics.  
Moreover, as established politicians and journalists since have entered this online public, it is 
a lasting addition to Kuwaiti politics and outlived the Orange Movement. Politicians and 
journalists enter this arena to communicate more directly with new parts of their society, 
taking them seriously as voters, voices and participants in Kuwaiti politics. But perhaps most 
importantly, an online public, even when it does not affect the offline reality, but especially 
when it does, may give its participants political experience and political expectations. To put 
it simply; the protagonists get used to express their view, to support or criticize others, and to 
be heard and to be taken seriously. I find it very difficult to believe that these expectations 
disappeared when the orange t-shirts were taken off.     
1.1.3 The need for case studies of connected sites 
As we have seen, Web 2.0 offers some technical features which ease some actions we 
associate with the term the public sphere, which in turn may have a positive effect in terms of 
democratization. However, this does not mean that this technology necessarily leads to this 
outcome: 
Different technologies make different kinds of human action and interaction easier or harder to 
perform. All other things being equal, things that are easier to do are more likely to be done, and 
things that are harder to do are less likely to be done. All other things are never equal. That is 
why technological determinism in the strict sense – if you have technology “t”, you should 
expect social structure or relation “s” to emerge – is false.22 
 
Practical examples point in the same direction; whereas Facebook has been a successful tool 
for mobilization and debate in Egypt
23
, for many it is perhaps primarily a tool for amusement. 
And while YouTube was used by the Orange Movement to document their own campaign
24
, 
the most viewed video on December 16
th
 2009 at 15:00 was “Happy Slip Singalong: Get into 
                                                 
22
 Benkler: 17 
23
 See for instance: Shapiro (2009), The New York Times. At the moment, there is no consensus as to how one 
should refer to articles from online newspapers, but the trend seems to be towards citing the author rather 
than the newspaper. However, in order to separate newspaper articles from academic articles, I have listed the 
newspaper articles separately in the list of references. Thus, throughout this thesis, whenever a newspaper is 
cited, I give the author as well as the name of the newspaper. The reader may then find the article in question, 
with its respective URL, under “List of newspapers cited” in the list of references.   
24
 See examples in chapter 5.2 
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the holiday spirit with Happy Slip and YouTube's first ever virtual caroling event.”25. A 
random example like this of course, proves nothing else than the fact that YouTube can be a 
lot of things to a lot of people.  
For this reason, one should be careful with general conclusions. Moreover, it is important to 
be specific of what kinds of sites, which technological features that make out the basis for a 
study, and not simply refer to “the internet”. Lastly, to only study the technology itself would 
be insufficient with regards to democratization, as the practical use varies greatly. Thus, I 
argue that a properly contextualized case study would be a preferable research design in order 
to identify any democratizing effects brought on by the internet. Moreover, the notion of the 
public sphere seems to be a suitable framework for a study of this kind.  In the following, I 
seek to present such a study, using the Kuwaiti Orange Movement of 2006 as my case of 
study.  
1.2 Research question and hypothesis 
Based on this introduction to my subject of study, the questions I seek to answer through this 
thesis are as follows: 
- For what purposes did the OM use the internet, and what were the opportunities this 
use of the internet brought forth, that would have otherwise been lost or impossible? 
- Did the internet constitute a public sphere for the OM and other engaged internet users 
in Kuwait, in which to discuss, form opinions, convey news and so on? 
The working hypothesis which has guided this study is as follows:  
During 2006, I believe the internet constituted a public sphere for Kuwaitis, in which to 
convey unfiltered news, discuss, agitate, expose corruption, mobilize, and more. The 
protagonists could engage each other in ways impossible offline, and their efforts affected the 
Kuwaiti reality, enhancing the participatory aspect of Kuwait‟s democratic project. However, 
even though the internet carries features which facilitate these kinds of communication, it 
does not make them happen. Its actual usage in this way depends, as with all other forms of 
                                                 
25
 This was noted by the author on the exact time given above, at YouTube.com. Unfortunately, there are no 
permalinks for the most viewed video at any given time. Thus, this is impossible to document in any 
other way than stating the exact date and time.  
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communication, on its users. Still, given the abovementioned assumptions, I believe that in 
Kuwait, public opinion can be formed and acted upon, independently of the state and the 
political elite. 
1.3 Outline of this thesis – limitations of the study 
The primary material for this study consists of online content from sites used by the Orange 
Movement, as well as interviews with key members of the OM, and a Kuwaiti journalist. In 
addition, I have used various secondary sources such as academic literature, newspaper 
articles and a documentary on the Orange Movement. The online material I have gathered is 
mainly from May, June and July 2006, as these were the most active months for the OM. 
However, I have included some material from the “official blog”26 of the movement from 
January 2006 and the last days of April 2006, in order to trace the origins of the OM. Thus, 
even though I briefly discuss the Kuwaiti blogosphere in order to contextualize my study, this 
is not a general study of Kuwaiti blogs, forums, or other sites of communication. Neither is it 
a general study of online activism in Kuwait and the Middle East. It is precisely what I have 
argued for above, a specific case study of a particular movement within a limited time frame, 
and it is important to bear this in mind when reading this thesis. 
Moreover, due to the limited scope of this thesis, the basis for all my discussions is Kuwaiti 
citizens, not all the country‟s inhabitants. Thus, I do not treat the question of foreign workers‟ 
rights, for which Kuwait – in my view rightfully – has received much criticism. One may of 
course object to the relevance of a study of political participation involving only half of the 
country‟s population. Still, as of today non-Kuwaitis are excluded from the country‟s political 
scene, so if foreign workers are to improve their lot in Kuwait, political changes are needed. 
And the basis for any such changes is Kuwaiti citizens.  
Bearing these limitations in mind, I proceed below to present the study described in the 
introduction above. First, I discuss the methodological choices I have made, and demonstrate 
how I conducted this study. I then move on to a consideration of the theoretical context within 
which I place my findings, that is, the notion of the public sphere. Moving on, I seek to 
contextualize my study through a brief introduction to Kuwaiti politics and Kuwaiti internet 
culture, also touching upon the issue of censorship. Having established the methodology, 
                                                 
26
  That is, ”Kuwaitjunior”, termed the official blog by Mary Ann Tétrault (2006a) 
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theory and the context, I present the Orange Movement, their main issue, and how they came 
into being. I then go through the online material I have gathered, and lay out my analysis of 
its contents. From there, I discuss my findings in relation to my theoretical discussion 
presented earlier, and explore the relevance of the notion of the public sphere with regard to 
the Orange Movement. Towards the end of the thesis, I seek to go beyond the movement, and 
discuss its possible lasting effects on Kuwaiti politics, society and not least internet usage. 
Lastly, I sum up my findings in my final conclusions. 
 
10 
 
2 Methodology  
 
2.1 Internet inquiries 
My study is based on both online and offline data, with the bulk of my material made out of 
online findings. According to Shani Orgad, with the term “online data”, we refer to “(…) 
materials obtained using what have been often described as virtual methodologies: methods 
implemented by and through the internet”27. For my study, this includes both analysis of 
online materials such as discussions, postings, and visual elements, as well as an interview 
conducted through e-mail. I will return to the e-mail interview below. As for the discussions, 
posts, and so on, these were carried out and posted in 2006. I have not altered them or 
interfered in any way, but simply observed, downloaded and analyzed them, without making 
my presence known in any way I have been aware of. It should be noted that I have done so 
more than two years after the Orange Movement‟s campaign ended. 
Studying such online data provides “some intriguing possibilities”, as Christine Hine puts it, 
in the “many traces of social activities that it preserves, in the form of web sites, message 
boards, hyperlinks etc.”28. Thus, even though the Orange Movement were active during the 
summer of 2006, their discussions, news, pictures, videos and so on is still available online. 
Nevertheless, this may very well change abruptly, and I have downloaded and saved all the 
contents included in this study. 
However, the ability to “go back in time” is not the only intriguing possibility of the internet 
as a field of study. As Anette Markham points out: “ (…) the Internet provides new channels 
for people to communicate with each other, new channels for researchers to communicate 
with participants, and new venues for conducting research (…) Thus, researchers can tap into 
emerging discursive forms and practices (…)”29. There may of course be certain sites, forums 
and so on that are protected by a password or in some other way, and therefore not accessible. 
But in many cases, including this study, the researcher is able to “tap into” communication 
                                                 
27
 Orgad (2008): 35 
28
 Hine (2008): 11 
29
 Markham (2004): 96 
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which takes place or have taken place, without making their presence known and thus altering 
the conditions for communication.  
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that there are difficulties related to a study on the use of 
internet like this. For one thing, the anonymity provided by the net, though valuable for many 
reasons, does make it difficult to determine the age, gender, background and so on of online 
protagonists, as well as questions such as how many different users are actually taking part in 
a debate. Furthermore, the intentions, goals and motivations of the protagonists are not 
necessarily something one might read out of a discussion. Moreover, online text may of 
course be edited, removing or adding bits and parts. Especially when studying communication 
that has already taken place, this may be a very relevant problem. However, I seek to support 
my online findings with secondary literature, the movement‟s offline actions and my own 
interviews, thereby contextualizing my findings in Kuwaiti society, and, hopefully, 
minimizing any impact of these difficulties. In the following, I seek to illustrate how I have 
dealt with these and other challenges, as well as how I have used and analyzed the material of 
my study. 
2.1.1 Internet and contextualization 
In order to study online findings, one needs to contextualize them in their offline 
surroundings. As Shani Orgad notes, “It has become clear that the separation between online 
and offline cannot be sustained. Researchers have consistently argued for the need to frame 
the online both in its own right and in relation to other contexts and realities”30. In other 
words, the cultural, sociological and political context in which the Orange Movement 
operated is of great importance for my study. A proper contextualization can help illuminate 
questions such as why the OM chose to work over the internet as opposed to gather at a café, 
who uses the internet in Kuwait, why the question of the electoral districts was so important 
and so on. Moreover, such a contextualization helps illustrate important features of the 
movement. For instance, one important gain of the movement was that men and women 
worked together, and discussed with each other online. This would not seem important unless 
one takes into consideration that Kuwaiti schools and universities are segregated, and that 
even liberal parliamentary candidates separate men and women at events during their 
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campaign
31. As Orgad points out: “(…) to gather offline data is based in a perceived need to 
add context (…), to yield insights into aspects that would otherwise remain invisible, but that 
may be consequential to the research”32. 
 
Furthermore, the offline context as well as the movement‟s offline activities will of course be 
important to determine the effect of their online work. One could hardly put an exact figure on 
the effect of the Orange Movement, and this is not my intention either. But once again, a 
proper contextualization can be useful. For instance, even though public demonstrations is a 
common sight in many countries, for instance Norway, this was not so in Kuwait before the 
OM, due to the law on public gatherings. But following the OM, this has changed. I do not 
claim that this is solely thanks to the OM, but the point could still be missed if one assumed 
public gatherings to be a common thing a priori.  
 
In chapter 4, I provide a presentation of the Kuwaiti context, focusing on Kuwaiti politics, 
history, and internet usage, mainly based on secondary sources. But also my interviews have 
been very valuable in this regard, and I return to the question of the context during my 
discussions in other chapters as well. To give an example, the special importance of the 
concept of national unity in Kuwaiti politics influenced the language used by the main blog of 
the OM, as I will discuss in depth later.  
2.2 Studying the Orange Movement 
2.2.1 Case study 
As mentioned earlier, I intend to use the “Orange Movement” as my case of study. However, 
as Stake points out; “Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be 
studied”33. And once again, the issue of contextualization is of great importance: “(…) case 
study concentrates on experiential knowledge of the case and close attention to the influence 
of its social, political and other contexts”34. Yet, as Stakes argue, the phenomena come before 
the case, whereas the case itself is merely an opportunity “to study the phenomena”35. 
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The phenomenon behind this study is, at its most basic, the potential of the internet as a 
democratizing force. But as I have argued above and will argue below, the internet in itself 
provides tools and places, whereas the content has to be provided by the users, as well as the 
decision to use it for the purpose of promoting democracy and democratic reforms. Moreover, 
I believe this is best explored through the notion of the public sphere, and through properly 
contextualized case studies, as opposed to random examples from here and there. I believe the 
Orange Movement and their use of the internet make a good case for such a study, for several 
reasons. 
 
Firstly, the Orange Movement saw themselves as fighting for democratic reforms, and 
democracy was of great importance to the movement. Secondly, the movement made 
extensive use of the internet in their campaign, and were very conscious about this. Moreover, 
the sites they used were accessible to anyone, a may therefore have been used more widely 
than just the movement in itself. Lastly, this movement was ground breaking in the Kuwaiti 
context, in terms of using new technology, new campaign tactics, making new voices heard, 
and so on. For these reasons, I believe the case of the Orange Movement can illustrate both 
actual usage and future potential of the internet in Kuwait.  
 
It could of course be tempting to generalize my findings to conclude on the potential of the 
internet more widely than just in Kuwait. However, this would be in contradiction with my 
arguments above on both contextualization and the necessity of case studies. Yet, the findings 
of a case study can nevertheless be informative beyond itself: “(…) Case studies are of value 
in refining theory, suggesting complexities for further investigation as well as helping to 
establish the limits of generalizability”36.  
 
Lastly, in addition to deciding upon the case of study, one also needs to decide upon the 
“cases within the case”, that is, the “persons, places and events to observe”37. Below, I will 
show how I selected the sites I have studied, as well as the persons I have interviewed, and 
how these interviews were carried out. I then move on to discuss my method of analysis, and 
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lastly, to discuss how I have used different sources in this paper, the process usually referred 
to as triangulation.  
2.2.2 Identifying the Orange Movement – site selection 
I have made the selection of sites from a total of 19 blogs, one campaign site, one YouTube 
Channel and one online forum I have identified as part of and/or used by the movement. I 
have located these sites through various means; by the use of secondary sources
38
, by 
following links on the different sites
39
 and by Google searches
40
. As criteria for being part 
of/used by the movement, I have used the following: that the contents revolve around the 
struggle for five electoral districts and against corruption, and that the site is mentioned/linked 
to by other sites in the movement. Furthermore, the relevance of the sites has also been 
confirmed through my interviews. However, this does not mean that I have identified all sites 
that might be part of the movement. 
The material for this study consists of the movement`s campaign site, its YouTube channel 
and six blogs which I believe represent the width of the movement, that is, they represent 
authors of different age, gender, in different situations and with different focus. For the sake 
of simplicity I have used the names of the blogs that are included in their URL, which do not 
necessarily correspond to the name they use themselves. URLs for the sites downloaded and 
other details are not included here; please refer to “blogs” in the list of references. Data on the 
blogs and their authors are taken from the “profile” pages of the blogs, unless other sources 
are given. These sites are as follows: 
Blogs: 
“Kuwaitjunior”:  URL: http://kuwaitjunior.blogspot.com. Arabic name: Sāḥat al-Ṣafāt (“Safāt 
square”) By Tétrault described as the ”official” blog of the movement. The blog has four 
writers, all male. They all provide their e-mail addresses on their profiles. The blog was 
established in December 2004, and is written in Arabic. During May, June and July 2006 the 
blog had a total of 68 postings, with 6565 comments all together.  
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 See for instance Tétrault (2006a) 
39
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“Ma6goog.com”: URL: http://www.ma6goog.com. Arabic name: Ṭākh Ṭīkh (“Pow Wow”41). 
The blog has one male author, who provides an e-mail address in the profile. The blog was 
established in August 2004, and is written almost exclusively in Arabic. During May, June 
and July 2006 the blog had a total of 60 postings, with 1498 comments all together.  
“The Ultimate”:  URL: http://3asal.blogspot.com. The blog has later been moved to 
WordPress: http://3asal.wordpress.com. No Arabic name. The blog has one female writer. She 
does not provide her e-mail address in her profile, but does provide personal interest. The 
blog also raises feminist issues. In addition, the author has published several poems on the 
site. The blog was established in August 2004, and is written almost exclusively in English. 
During May, June and July 2006 the blog had a total of 49 postings, with 591 comments all 
together.  
“Kuwaitwall”:  URL: http://kuwaitwall.blogspot.com. Arabic name: al-Sūr (“The Wall”). The 
blog has one male writer. E-mail address is provided in profile. The blog was established in 
May 2006, and is written in Arabic. During May, June and July 2006 the blog had a total of 
17 postings, with 153 comments all together.  
“Kuwaitvoice”:  URL: http://kuwaitvoice.blogspot.com.  No Arabic name. The blog has one 
male writer. E-mail address is provided in profile. This blog provides large amounts of 
pictures and videos. The blog was established in May 2005, and is written in Arabic. During 
May, June and July 2006 the blog had a total of 22 postings, with no comments.  
“Miscellaneous”:  URL: http://yaob.blogspot.com.  No Arabic name. The blog has one female 
writer. No e-mail address is provided in profile, but personal interests are. The blog has a 
more personal touch than the others, in that the writer provides many pictures of her family, 
also from events connected to the Orange Movement. The blog was established in June 2005, 
and is written in Arabic. During May, June and July 2006 the blog had a total of 18 postings, 
with 363 comments all together.  
It is important to note that not all posts on all blogs were related to the OM and the issue of 
the electoral districts.  
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YouTube: 
“Kuwaitvoice`s channel”:  URL: http://www.youtube.com/kuwaitvoice.This channel was 
started on the 13
th
 of May 2006. As of the 7
th
 of November 2008, it had 28 subscribers, 1717 
videos watched and 1727 channel viewers. It contained 13 videos.  
Campaignsite: 
“Kuwait5.org”:  URL: http://www.kuwait5.org.The name of the site is registered as 
ʼasmiʻhum ṣawtaka … khamsa dwāʼir (“Make them hear your voice … five 
constituencies”)42. It was created on the 25th of April 2006, according to domaintools.com43. 
The site was designed by Jāsim al-Qāmis of "kuwaitjunior".  
I have downloaded and saved the entire contents of these sites for the period of May until the 
end of July 2006.  
2.2.3 Interviews 
In addition to the sites mentioned above, information gathered through interviews has also 
been of great importance for my thesis. I have interviewed three different bloggers active in 
the Orange Movement, an activist, and a Kuwaiti journalist. In the following I will present 
these informants, as well as how I made contact with them, and conducted the interviews. All 
these interviews were recorded. Moreover, as one of the interviews was conducted through e-
mail, I have archived the entire correspondence.  
 
To begin with the interviews conducted in person in Kuwait, these included blogger 
Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, author of “ma6goog.com”, Jāsim al-Qāmis, one of the main organizers 
of the OM as well as one of the authors of “Kuwaitjunior”, Khālid al-Faḍḍāla, one of the main 
organizers of the OM and now leader of the National Democratic Alliance
44
, and Dāhim al-
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Qaḥṭānī, journalist in al-Rāy and founder of “Center for Democracy in Kuwait”45. Originally, 
I had hoped to be able to speak with more bloggers, as well as with what might be termed 
“average internet users”. Though this is a rather unclear categorization, my intention was to 
speak with Kuwaiti students, as they have free internet access through their universities. 
Moreover, as I discuss below in connection with Deborah Wheeler‟s study of internet usage 
in Kuwait, young people make up the bulk of internet users in the country. However, as I 
made my journey to Kuwait during the summer holidays, students proved difficult to reach. In 
retrospect, this, combined with Kuwait‟s unfriendly summer climate, suggests that my 
fieldwork might have been better conducted at a different time. Yet, I believe I was able to 
gather the information I needed through the interviews I was able to conduct. 
 
To get in touch with the bloggers, I started by e-mailing them, in both Arabic and English, to 
the addresses provided on the profile pages of their blogs. However, I received only one reply 
to these e-mail, from Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of Ma6goog.com. Yet, it turned out that Mr. al-
Yousofi was well connected, both to other bloggers and to the Kuwaiti political scene, and 
thanks to his kind assistance, I also came in contact with Mr. al-Qāmis and Mr. al-Fadhala. In 
addition, he provided me with the e-mail address of the blogger “Ayya” of The Ultimate, 
whom I interviewed through e-mail. In addition, Dr. Kjetil Selvik of the University of Oslo 
provided me with contact information for both prominent politicians and journalists. Of these, 
Mr. al-Qaḥṭānī replied, and accordingly, I met with him during my stay in Kuwait.  
 
The interviews in Kuwait were mainly carried out in English. This was not my choice, but the 
Kuwaitis I interviewed seemingly assumed that as a foreigner, I did not speak Arabic. 
However, I made them aware that as an Arabic student, I speak Arabic, and from time to time 
during my interviews, we switched to Arabic. Yet, by far the main part of the interviews were 
conducted in English.  
 
Then there is the methodological question of what kind of interview would be most suited for 
my purposes, that is, which design would provide me with the information I needed. Fontana 
& Frey discusses different kinds of interviews in their article “The Interview – From Neutral 
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Stance to Political Involvement”, and points to two basic design patterns, namely structured 
and unstructured interviews. In their view, the structured interview involves the researcher 
asking “all respondents the same series of preestablished questions with a limited set of 
response categories”46. Unstructured interviews, on the other hand, do not include a 
dedication to a set of questions, and may “provide greater breadth than do other types 
(…)”47. With the very limited number of people I interviewed, quantitative data could not be 
established, and this was never my intention. Rather, as it turned out, what I would be doing 
was to speak with a limited number of key figures in the movement, as well as one 
journalist/activist. Given this, I believed the most productive approach would be to hear their 
own version of the work of the Orange Movement, and their own thoughts on their use of the 
internet. Moreover, the interviews provided a great opportunity for me to ask about subjects 
and details that were unclear to me, and to ask rather open questions in order to discover 
points and angles I myself had overlooked. Still, it would be important, especially when 
asking about events, articles and the like which were known to me, not to let my interpretation 
be evident in my questions. Thus, I concluded that neither structured nor unstructured 
approaches were ideal. 
 
Rather, a design placed somewhere in the middle, the so-called semi-structured approach
48
, 
would be the most suitable. That is, I prepared a list of questions which I used as a basis for 
the interviews, but at the same time, I did not commit myself to these questions alone, and 
allowed for the respondents to talk rather freely on the subjects raised. As it turned out, this 
led to the respondents mentioning details and views I hadn‟t thought of beforehand, but at the 
same time gave me the time to ask all the questions I wanted. I have included my list of 
questions in the appendix. 
 
As for the interview conducted through e-mail, this naturally became somewhat different 
from the ones made in person. I first contacted the respondent on e-mail after getting the 
address from Mr. al-Yūsufī, author of “ma6goog.com”. I did not know then, and still do not 
know, the identity of the blogger I interviewed. All I knew was that she used the same 
nickname in her e-mail address as did the blogger, and that Mr. al-Yūsufī told me that she was 
the very same person, which I have no reason to doubt. Moreover, the answers I received 
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from her were consistent with what I would expect from this particular blogger, both in style 
and content. As for the interview itself, it consisted of me sending her questions, to which she 
replied. She then decided to answer the questions in a form similar to an essay, which 
naturally gave her answers a more literary character than the other interviews. Moreover, 
when conducting interviews in this fashion, one looses the opportunity to follow up directly 
interesting points. On the other hand, this gives the respondent the opportunity to focus on the 
issues important to her, which again provides new information to me.  
 
Lastly, it is important to note that all respondents have given me permission to use both their 
names and their quotes in my thesis. I asked for this permission both when the interviews 
were made, as well as through e-mails. 
2.3 Analysis 
I have shown above how I found and made contact with my informants, conducted my 
interviews, as well as how I identified and downloaded the sites I have studied. However, 
with regard to these sites – the blogs, the campaign site, the YouTube channel – the most 
important part remains; how to make sense of the material I have gathered.  Put simply, I 
must choose a methodological approach to texts I study in this thesis. This choice in turn 
depends on my research question; what do I seek to find out by analyzing these texts?  
 
My research questions are rather open ended, and so should my methodological approach be. 
If I am to find out to what ends the OM made use of the internet, and if the internet indeed 
constituted a public sphere for those activists, my analysis needs to be able to capture a wide 
variety of meanings conveyed. And perhaps most importantly, ideally it should not exclude 
any of said meanings. Though this ideal may be hard to live up to, it should guide the choices 
I make in terms of methodology. 
 
Peräkylä suggests that an “informal approach” might be a sound alternative when analyzing 
texts: “An informal approach may, in many cases, be the best choice as a method in research 
focusing on written texts”49. When scholars use such an “informal approach”, they do so “(…) 
by reading and rereading their empirical materials, (…) try to pin down their key themes and, 
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thereby, to draw a picture of the presuppositions and meanings that constitute the cultural 
world of which textual material is a specimen”50. This seems like a preferable approach when 
the goal is to identify as much as possible of what is conveyed in the text, rather than looking 
for any particular elements. Yet, some of the concerns that need to be addressed in such an 
analysis, even though mentioned by Peräkylä, are more clearly articulated in the approach 
generally referred to as hermeneutics. These are concerns such as who the text is addressed to 
and why, what is conveyed and why, and not least, how I as a researcher deal with my own 
expectations and prejudice when reading the text. Thus, a hermeneutical approach offers 
useful tools for my analysis, and a brief discussion on the subject is needed. 
2.3.1 Hermeneutics 
In ”Hermeneutics – an introduction”51, the editors Sissel Lægreid and Torgeir Skorgen 
provide both a translation of the term hermeneutics, as well as a discussion and an 
interpretation of how the concept embodied in the term should be applied. The translation 
provided gives three meanings, all related to their interpretation: expression, interpretation 
and translation
52
. As for their interpretation, their main concern seems to be the prejudice and 
the expectations of any reader of any text. In their view, “(…) there are no experiences that 
aren’t in some way or another dependent upon prejudice or predisposal”53. However, before I 
discuss the issue of my own prejudice as a reader, I start with the opposite question, which 
follows naturally from the quotation above: what is actually possible to deduct from a given 
text? In doing so, I will illustrate my own approach by giving an example from my analysis in 
chapter five. I will return to the question of my own prejudice in chapter 2.4. 
When reading through the material I have gathered, I seek to answer questions such as who 
are talking to whom and why, what are they saying and why, do they use any particular words 
and if so, why, what could be their intentions and why, and so on. To give an example; the 
authors of the “Kuwaitjunior” blog notoriously use the first person plural, “we”, and often 
speak to or on behalf of “the people of Kuwait”, or “the sons and daughters of Kuwait”. They 
often stress the unity of the people, and that they run their campaign for the sake of their 
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country. They even use the slogan “5 – for the sake of Kuwait”54. Applying the questions 
given above to these particular parts of text, what can they tell me?  
Firstly, these questions help the reader identify such careful use of particular words. Extensive 
use of the same words is hardly a coincidence, and certainly important in order to answer the 
questions given above. Yet, the reason behind these precise words is by no means self-
evident. They may indicate that the authors sincerely believe that they are running their 
campaign for the sake of their country, that they believe they can gather wider support if they 
do so, or both. They may indicate that the authors believe they have a majority of the country 
behind them, that they believe they will be taken more seriously if it seems like they have a 
majority behind them, or both. In other words, these bits of texts may by themselves carry 
important information for my thesis, but they may be interpreted differently, and do not by 
themselves provide enough information to determine which interpretation(s) seems the most 
likely. Thus, I must widen the scope and look at the wider context of which these bits of text 
are a part. 
I then quickly discover that in addition to some undefined “we”, the authors also speak of 
some undefined “them”, who work against their cause, and constitute their opponents. This 
adds more information on the use of “we”; there is a division between those who are united in 
their struggle for reform, and those who are against them. Thus, an enemy, though 
ambiguously through an undefined “them”, is pointed out, and anyone who supports their 
cause is made part of a community. Through my interviews it was confirmed that this was no 
coincidence; for the authors of this blog, it was important to make people feel an important 
part of a movement. However, if we widen the scope further, we learn even more on the use 
of these particular words. 
Properly contextualized in Kuwaiti society and politics, these particular words not only seem 
natural to use, but perhaps almost mandatory. As I will discuss below, the question of national 
unity, and the fear of sectarian unrest, is of great importance in Kuwaiti politics. Anyone 
coming across as instigating such unrest not only stands the risk of losing support, but also of 
severe reactions from the authorities. In this context, this careful selections of words is hardly 
surprising, not using these words could have harmed the campaign.  
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As we have seen, different interpretations are possible, and they are not mutually exclusive. 
The reason behind these words may be that the author believe they represent a majority, that 
they believe this will bring them more support, that they wish to create a community and in 
order to avoid a sectarian appearance. Widening the scope and bringing in new sources of 
information have brought more information, and also help me substantiate some 
interpretations. This is an important part of the hermeneutical approach; studying both the 
individual bits of text, as well as the whole body of texts, and by doing so, answering the 
questions mentioned above. But as I have shown, other sources than the text itself is of 
importance in this process, not least in terms of minimizing the impact of one‟s own 
prejudice. Below, I provide a discussion of this method, most often referred to as 
triangulation.        
2.4 Using different sources – triangulation 
As mentioned above, Lægreid and Skorgen claim that no experiences can be separated from 
one‟s prejudice. Though interesting, I will not focus on whether or not their claim is accurate, 
but rather on how to minimize this influence of one‟s own expectations. Firstly, awareness in 
itself is important. In my research on the OM I need to take into account that I have certain 
expectations about how a political campaign is run, based on my experiences from Norwegian 
society. These expectations will likely guide my view on what is important for such a 
campaign. But Kuwait and Norway are two different societies, and my expectations may 
misguide me.  
For instance, growing up in Norway, I am used to what I myself perceive as a democratic and 
egalitarian society, values I also perceive as just. Thus, I might be inclined to be sympathetic 
towards what I sense as a struggle for a more democratic society. This might in turn affect my 
view on the Orange Movement, as well as my view of those who disagreed with the Orange 
Movement. In addition, I may not appreciate the significance of events, such as holding a 
public demonstration, which could seem trivial in Norway, but was of great importance in 
Kuwait. Moreover, I most certainly have had other expectations as well, some of which I 
might not even be aware of myself. Thus, I might end up misunderstanding, misinterpreting, 
overlooking important information and overemphasize unimportant information. Ideally, I 
would be able to overlook my expectations, but more realistically, methodological tools can 
help minimize their effect. 
23 
 
One such tool is triangulation, and as Robert E. Stake points out, it is an important procedure 
to “reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation”55. Moreover, Stake argues that: 
Triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify 
meaning, verifying the repeatability of and observation or interpretation. But acknowledging 
that no observations or interpretations are perfectly repeatable, triangulation serves also to 
clarify meaning by identifying different ways the case is being seen
56
. 
 
This has been my intention as well. Through the use of different sources, I seek to minimize 
the effects of my own prejudice, as well as to properly contextualize the material I analyze. 
As I have shown above, this contextualization has added important information to my 
interpretation of the texts I read, such as the importance of national unity with regards to the 
use of the first person plural and expressions like “For the sake of Kuwait”.  
Moreover, the use of different sources together helps substantiate claims made by myself as 
well as my informants, and to make probable some interpretations over others. In addition, it 
helps establish the events that took place, though this is of course also a question of 
interpretation. To give an example; how did the OM decide it was time to take to the streets, 
and hold their first demonstration? As I show below (chapter 5.2.5, “Discussions”), the 
suggestion to do so was made in a comment to an article on the “Kuwaitjunior” blog. A few 
hours later, after some discussion in the comments field, a new post was published on the 
same blog, announcing the demonstration, and informing readers of when and where to 
gather. Does this mean that the decision to hold a demonstration was taken online? The online 
material, that is, the posts and the comments, suggests so, in that the suggestion was made, 
discussed, and then the demonstration announced. Also Amir al-Zuhair‟s documentary on the 
OM, entitled “When the people spoke”, highlight this online discussion57. Moreover, my 
informants all point to the importance of online discussions with regards to decision making 
within the movement. Yet, the example of such online decision making given by one of the 
authors of this particular blog was the choice of the color orange to represent the movement. 
In addition, through my interviews, I know that the authors of the blog – together with some 
other key organizers of the movement – discussed the subject of holding a demonstration. 
One of their concerns was whether or not people would show up if they announced it, given 
that no one knew who they were at the time.  
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Thus, I know that the suggestion was made online, that it was discussed online, that the 
demonstration was announced online, that the participants in the OM hold that online decision 
making was important, but also that it was discussed offline. And it is of course impossible to 
say whether or not those who supported the idea online would have arranged their own 
demonstration, had not the blog announced the one that actually took place. To sum up, I 
cannot with certainty establish when the decision was made, and by who. However, it seems 
probable that the idea appeared online, and that the online support it received was important, 
all the time the ones who in the end announced that a demonstration would take place were 
insecure about whether or not people would show up. Moreover, the use of different sources 
has confirmed for me that this represents an important feature of the OM. Although my 
expectations may have affected me when I first noticed this incident and thought it important, 
its relevance has been confirmed by online material, interviews and secondary sources.   
Above, I have described the methodological choices I have made with regards to gathering 
and analysis of material for this thesis. In order to further treat this material, a theoretical 
context for its interpretation is needed. As I have argued, I believe the notion of the public 
sphere offers good perspectives for the study of a movement such as the OM. However, the 
notion of the public sphere is not a clearly defined concept. This thesis is not primarily meant 
as a contribution to any theoretical debate on the public sphere, but a brief discussion on the 
subject is nevertheless needed. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 The public sphere 
My point of departure is Habermas, who argues that with the term “the public sphere”; “we 
mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed”58. According to Habermas, a public sphere should be inclusive, its participants 
should be guaranteed freedom of speech and freedom of opinion on matters of general 
interest. It should be guided by a principle of rational-critical discourse striving for consensus, 
participants‟ status‟ should be overlooked, and it should be free from state intervention. The 
matters (of general interest) upon which participants reach consensus through rational-critical 
discourse should ideally be implemented in society. However, though one could hardly 
overlook the importance of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, many have 
criticized Habermas‟ normative ideal. 
Among the critics, Nancy Fraser argues that the bourgeoisie public sphere, upon which 
Habermas based his work, was not inclusive neither in terms of participants nor issues. 
Therefore, subordinated social groups “have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute 
alternative publics”, which she terms “subaltern counterpublics”59. As for issues, she argues 
that the idea that “matters of general interest” should be discussed in the public sphere is 
somewhat misleading, as issues which are now debated in the public previously were 
considered to be private, such as domestic violence. Therefore, “(...) there are no naturally 
given, a priori boundaries here”, and minorities must be guaranteed opportunities to 
“convince others that what in the past was not public in the sense of being a matter of 
common concern should now become so”60.  
Her view is supported by Dahlgren, who points out that “The term “public sphere” is most 
often used in the singular form, but sociological realism points to the plural”61. Dahlgren also 
criticize the ideal of rational consensus, noting that “in the advocacy/activist sector of the 
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online public sphere” - though “these organizations strives for internal consensus (...) - 
Externally (…), the thrust of their political address (…) is not to attain consensus, but rather 
to affect policy”62.  
Thus, we might view a public sphere as one of potentially many of its kind, in which opinion 
is formed for this particular public. The issues raised are determined by the concerns of the 
participants, and an important feature is to lift these issues into the public at large. While this 
sphere should be open and formally inclusive, it may be based mainly on one social group in 
society. Seeking consensus internally, this may not be the goal externally. As for freedom of 
expression and opinion, and freedom from state intervention, these are contested freedoms for 
many – especially in the Middle East – and may be the very issues a particular public seeks to 
affect, and should therefore not be assumed a priori. 
3.2 The public sphere and the internet 
“In a part of the world where print and broadcast media traditionally have been controlled by 
the government, digital networked spaces offer the possibility of a much richer public sphere 
than existed before, providing a venue for all manner of opinions and ideas, covering love, 
life, culture, economics, religion, and politics” 
(Mapping the Arab Blogosphere
63
) 
 
The quotation above, taken from the Mapping the Arab blogosphere project, clearly states 
that a public sphere is to be found online, a view supported by other scholars as well. In his 
book on American blogging, Aaron Barlow sticks to the original and uses Habermas‟ three 
institutional criteria to identify whether or not blogs constitute a new public sphere. He notes 
that “What the blogs have managed to do, in some respects, is re-establish the public sphere 
much in the way that the coffeehouses, salons, broadsheets, and pamphlets (and more) first 
established it three hundred years ago”64.  
With regards to the Middle East in specific, Salvatore and Le Vine notes that “(…) there 
would seem to be an emerging consensus among scholars of Islam and the Middle East that 
the “public sphere” offers a problematic field for investigating the thematic area of democratic 
development in the region that possesses greater analytical clarity and depth than has been 
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achieved utilizing the civil society framework”65. Eickelman and Anderson argue that there is 
an emerging Muslim public sphere, aided by the new media (which includes the Internet):  
(…) This combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates 
fosters an awareness on the part of the actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic 
values can be created and feeds into new senses of a public space that is discursive, 
performative and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state 
authorities
66
.     
 
However, there is no consensus on online public spheres. Jodi Dean, in her tellingly entitled 
essay “Why the Net is not a Public Sphere”, states that the “the notion of the public sphere is 
(...) not applicable to the Net (...)”67. She attacks the idea of not one but many public spheres, 
arguing that “(...) These attempts to save the concept by adding an “s” to it are not 
successful”68, because different counter publics either have the same norms, making them part 
of the same Habermasian sphere, or have different norms, in which case “(...) they are not 
publics but different sorts of groups – interest groups, say”69. In her view, the “Net” is the 
“architecture for communicative capitalism”, and should be theorized as a “zero 
institution”70.  
Not wanting to take part in a theoretical debate, I will not discuss her static view of the public 
sphere. However, though I believe there are public spheres to be found on the internet, I agree 
with Dean that the internet as such cannot be viewed as one. For one thing, many possible 
online activities have little to do with a public sphere (though the act of doing them may be 
the subject of public discussion), such as paying bills, finding a recipe or – for that matter – 
surfing for porn. Secondly, not everyone on the internet communicates with each other, they 
are not part of the same public, there are many publics online.  
Since the advent of “Web 2.0" and its user generated content, the tools for an online public 
sphere have been in place. Internet users can easily express their opinion, discuss, comment 
on articles, document events etc. And with the numerous free blog hosts, forums, YouTube 
and other sites that exists, the places – or, if you will, the online coffeehouses - are there as 
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well. However, the internet does not provide neither content nor participants. To constitute a 
public, the sites involved as well as the participants involved must be connected; random 
examples of debate does not constitute a public, neither does a blog no one reads. 
Furthermore, the sites must be open and formally inclusive, participants must be able to raise 
issues, in short; the sites must constitute a public in line with the characteristics of a public 
sphere given above. 
Still, although the internet makes this possible online, it does not necessarily happen. Many – 
as I have shown above – were extremely optimistic about the prospects of democratization 
being aided by the internet. But the internet merely provide the tools and the places, the rest is 
still up to each and everyone. 
3.3 Applying the public sphere framework 
Given that public spheres may exist online, how does one identify them? Dahlgren provides 
three dimensions that “provide an analytical point for examining the public sphere of any 
given society or analyzing the contribution of any given communication technology”71: the 
structural, the representational and the interactional. The structural dimension has to do with 
“formal institutional feature”, raising issues of “freedom of speech, access, and the dynamic 
of inclusion/exclusion”72. With regards to the internet, this has to do with “such things as the 
manner in which cyber-geography is organized in terms of legal, social, economic, cultural, 
technical, and even Web-architectual features”73. As for the representational dimension, this 
deals with media output, raising questions of “(...) fairness, accuracy, completeness, 
pluralism of views, agenda setting, ideological tendencies, modes of address, and so forth”74. 
Lastly, the dimension of interaction deals with both “citizens’ encounters with the media (...)”, 
as well as interaction between citizens, with the important point being that Dewey‟s argument 
that a public is “something other than just a media audience”75 In what follows later, I intend 
to make use of Dahlgren‟s three dimensions as I present my analysis in chapter six, always 
bearing in mind the features of a public sphere given above.  
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3.4 Summing up – how I studied the Orange 
Movement 
This thesis is an inquiry into any possible democratizing effects the internet might bring forth, 
with the Kuwaiti Orange Movement of 2006 as my case of study. As I have argued above, I 
believe a limited and properly contextualized case study of connected sites is the preferable 
design for such a study. I have shown how I have gathered online material, and exemplified 
how I can analyze these texts using a hermeneutical approach. Through the use of different 
sources – triangulation – I seek to minimize the effects of my own prejudice and expectations, 
as well as the effects of the insecurity online data carries with it, as explained above. 
Triangulation further helps me establish the events that took place, and to substantiate my 
claims and those of my informants.  
Through the notion of the public sphere I further investigate the relevance of my findings in 
terms of political participation and democratization. In the discussions above, I provide 
certain characteristics I believe are essential for any public sphere, online or offline. Though I 
argue that such publics may be situated and mediated online, this do not necessarily happen 
due to the internet in itself, it is dependent upon the users involved. Thus, a study of the actual 
usage of connected sites and the effects of this usage offline is needed, and I have presented 
the research design I believe is best suited to enable such a study. As I believe 
contextualization is an important part of this design, I start by providing a brief presentation 
of the Kuwaiti context the OM operated within. 
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4 The context 
 
4.1 Kuwaiti politics 
The still ruling Al-Ṣabāḥ family has “played a role in ruling Kuwait” for more than 200 
years
76. The country gained its independence from Britain in 1961, and the “fairly democratic 
constitution”77 instituted a parliament, even though parliamentary elections also were held in 
1938. Since independence, 12 parliamentary elections have been held in Kuwait, but the 
parliament and the constitution have also been suspended twice; between 1976 and 1981 and 
between 1986 and 1992
78
.  
Oil is of course an important feature in Kuwaiti politics. Originally, the Emirs were 
economically dependent on the merchants, who naturally demanded their say in the affairs of 
the state. However, with the transition to oil, Crystal points out that a new deal was struck as 
the rulers became economically independent of the trading families: “[i]n exchange for 
receiving a sizeable portion of oil revenues, the merchants renounced their historical claim to 
participate in decision making”79. In her 1990 (new edition 1995) study of Kuwait and Qatar, 
Crystal examines the impact of oil on political coalitions and state institutions. She argues that 
“ [o]il revenues, by precluding the coalition and institution building that is crucial to 
stability, have left these regimes vulnerable”80.  
Even though the oil revenues in Kuwait, in contrast to for instance in Saudi Arabia, goes to 
the state and not to the ruling family directly, they are of course of every importance to the 
Emir. According to Wheeler, as of 1975, “[t]he Kuwaiti government controls 100% of the oil 
industry`s profits”81. Furthermore, “[t]he government (…) owns 97 % of the land of Kuwait 
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and employs 95 % of the Kuwaiti population”82 . The same author notes that “the primacy of 
economic concerns over political aspirations continues in contemporary Kuwait”83. 
Salem points out that “Kuwait has a long history of consultative government, 
constitutionalism, and participatory politics unique among the monarchies of the Gulf 
Region”84. Michael Herb also expresses a somewhat positive view on the democratic aspects 
of Kuwaiti politics, as well as on the prospect of an emerging constitutional monarchy in the 
country
85
. In his study of Middle Eastern monarchies, he criticizes the rentier state theory, 
arguing that: 
The logic, for individual citizens, behind the desire for wise expenditure of state revenue 
is the same whether or not the government`s main activity is “tax and spend”, “borrow 
and spend” or “sell oil and spend”. In short, the formula “No representation without 
taxation,” needs a decent burial
86
  
 
 
Tétrault also looks positively on the prospect of a constitutional monarchy in Kuwait, and 
refuses the notion of Arab “exceptionalism”87. Furthermore, and interestingly for my study, 
she points to populism as an important force for democratization, and claims that “(…) 
populism and constitutionalism are interconnected strategies for democratization”88. She also 
makes the argument that the Iraqi occupation, although obviously a traumatic experience in 
the history of Kuwait, enhanced the pro-democratization forces in the country
89
.   
However, different sources point out that Kuwait is not yet an electoral democracy, and that 
politics still is dominated by the ruling family
90
. The 50 member parliament is elected for four 
years in general elections, whereas the cabinet – which has 15 seats in parliament as well – is 
appointed by the Emir. Important ministries such as defense, interior and foreign affairs, are 
traditionally reserved for members of the royal family, as is the post of prime minister. Still, 
Freedom house notes that since the restoration of parliament in 1992, “the parliament played 
an active role in monitoring the Amir and the government, often forcing cabinet ministers out 
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of office and blocking legislation proposed by the ruling family”91. Also Michael Herb points 
out that the parliament “has been increasingly enthusiastic about using the tools it does 
have”92, though these powers are, as he notes, “largely negative”93. The result is a power 
struggle between the royal family and the parliament which has given Kuwait three elections 
and seven governments since 2006, all governments headed by the Emir‟s nephew Sheykh 
Nāṣir Muḥammad al-ʼAhmad al-Jābir al-Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ 94. As al-Jazeera„s Hashem 
Ahelbarra puts it: “Kuwait faces the challenge of maintaining a relatively democratic system 
while preserving quasi-absolute powers of the ruling family”95. This seems to indicate one of 
the main issues in Kuwaiti politics: the distribution of power within the system. Whereas the 
Emir blames parliament for hindering development by blocking initiatives
96
, the Parliament 
seems determined to have their say in politics. 
The power struggle is often played out through MPs use of one of their constitutional tools, 
interpellation of ministers (Arabic: ʼistijwāb, often referred to in Kuwaiti english newspapers 
as “grilling”). Kuwaiti MP„s have the right to interpellate ministers in parliament on a 
particular issue,  such as alleged squandering of public funds or corruption, and the 
interpellation may be followed of a vote of no confidence if ten MPs demand so
97
. With the 
government wanting to avoid the humiliation of such a process, interpellations - especially 
when directed at cabinet members from the ruling al-Ṣabāḥ family - have notoriously led to 
the cabinet resigning, or the Emir dissolving parliament
98
. However, if the government is 
confident in gaining a majority, the vote of no confidence might take place, as it did in the 
summer of 2009
99
. Moreover, the Kuwaiti political scene has witnessed some encouraging 
events lately, as the Prime Minister himself chose to face a vote of confidence in parliament 
in December 2009
100
. Though there is no reason to doubt that the government was confident a 
majority would back the PM, it is nevertheless a big step in terms of the government and the 
                                                 
91
 Freedom House (2008) 
92
 Brown (2008) 
93
 Herb (2009): 380 
94
 Herb: Kuwait Politics Database 
95
 Ahelbarra (2009), Aljazeera.net 
96
 Brown (2008), see also Kholaif & Ibrahim (2008), Arab Times Online  
97
 Al-Diwan al-Amiri: The Constitution, §99 – 103 
98
 See for instance: Izzak, B. (2010a), Kuwait Times Online 
99
 I`m referring to the no confidence vote directed against Sheikh Jabir on July 2
nd : 
Izzak, B. (2009a), Kuwait 
Times Online
 
100
 Izzak, B. (2010a), Kuwait Times Online. To be precise, the vote that was held was not called a vote of no 
confidence. When it comes to the PM, the Kuwaiti constitution states that the parliament can only vote on a 
motion of no cooperation. However, the lack of confidence would be just as clear from such a vote, and the 
PM would be forced to resign.  
33 
 
ruling family accepting the right of the parliament to monitor their work. Still, this was yet to 
come when the OM campaigned in 2006, and political stalemate was – and perhaps still might 
be – a part of Kuwaiti politics. 
However, other political struggles were also part of the picture in 2006. Kuwait has been 
described as a “deeply divided”101 society, both along sectarian and tribal lines, as well as 
between secular and religious elements in society. To begin with the dispute between 
religious and secular parts of society, it is often displayed in parliament as struggles between 
islamists and liberals. Tétrault points out that one of the first victories of islamists after they, 
in her account, entered parliament in 1981, was the total prohibition of alcohol in 1983, which 
until then was legal for foreigners in the country
102
. As late as in 1996 segregation between 
male and female students were introduced in all levels of education
103
. To give a more recent 
example; after women for the first time were elected to parliament in 2009, islamist MPs 
demanded they wear veils in the national assembly. Two of the four women elected, ʼAsīl al-
ʻAwaḍī and Rūlā Dashtī, refused, and the issue is still being debated104. 
Then there is the issue of members of the big tribes of Kuwait versus the city dwellers, or as it 
is known in Kuwait, of badū versus ḥaḍar105. This is a very sensitive issue in Kuwait, and any 
activity that might stir tensions between the two groups is not viewed favorably, hence the 
importance of national unity, as I have mentioned earlier. A recent example of the importance 
of this issue occurred in December 2009. On a show on his own TV-channel, al-Sūr106, the 
former electoral candidate Muḥammad al-Juwayhil charged that only city dwellers were real 
citizens of the country. Not surprisingly, this sparked an outrage among prominent tribal 
representatives
107
. Al-Juwayhil was arrested, and the government, with the support of several 
law makers, proposed amendments to the country‟s media laws, by many viewed as 
restrictions on the freedom of expression
108
. In addition, the minister of media had to face 
interpellation in parliament followed by a vote of no confidence, for his alleged inability to 
deal with the issue
109
. As for sectarianism, tension between the country‟s 70 % Sunni majority 
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and 30 % Shia minority
110
 is yet another sensitive issue, and another part of the national unity 
which is not to be stirred up
111
.  
The Orange Movement must be viewed against this background of a power struggle, alleged 
corruption and political stalemate, and not least the sensitivity concerning national unity. The 
declared goal of the movement was to change the number of electoral districts from 25 to 
five, and to work against corruption. Importantly, the issue of the electoral districts is closely 
linked to both corruption and the power struggle in Kuwait. Furthermore, the issue circulated 
for years in Kuwaiti politics, exemplifying the political stalemate in the country, as I will 
show below. Moreover, the movement needed to make sure it did not come across as 
attacking the unity of the Kuwaiti people in any way. Lastly, if they were to build a wide 
alliance, they would need to bridge the gap between liberals and islamists.  
4.2 Kuwait and the internet 
Whereas Kuwaiti politics is one part of the context within which the OM must be viewed, the 
internet culture of the country is another, no less important part. Kuwait was one of the first 
countries in the region to make the Internet commercially accessible to the public, in 1992
112
. 
Furthermore, the country has for many years offered free Internet access to all university 
students
113
. As of 2008, there were more than 280 000 Internet subscribers in Kuwait, 
including 25 000 broad band subscribers, and approximately 31.57 % of the population was 
online
114
. The country experienced a user growth of 500 % between the years 2000 and 
2008
115
.  
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Figure 1: Internet penetration in Kuwait, 2008
116
 
 
With regards to censorship, article 36 of the Kuwaiti constitution states that “Freedom of 
opinion and scientific research is guaranteed, and all people have the right to express their 
view and to propagate their view in writing or speech or otherwise, in accordance with the 
conditions and regulations made clear by/evident in the law”117. Article 49 states that 
“Compliance with the public order and respect for public moral is a duty upon all inhabitants 
of Kuwait”118. It is perhaps not surprising then that Freedom House reported in 2009 that the 
government has “directed Internet service providers to block certain sites for political and 
moral reasons”119.  
FILTERING No evidence of filtering Suspected filtering Selective filtering Substantial filtering Pervasive filtering 
Political          
Social        
Conflict/Security          
Internet tools        
Figure 2: Kuwait, results at a glance, from OpenNet Initiative
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This is confirmed by the OpenNet Initiative as well, which points out that private ISPs “freely 
block” sites deemed to be immoral, whereas the Ministry of Communication focuses on sites 
“critical of the government or seen to support terrorism”121. The OpenNet Initiative also 
points to the issue of surveillance: “(…) There are cases of internet surveillance efforts as 
well as calls from officials to monitor online activities”122.  The issue of surveillance reached 
the headlines in the fall of 2009, with Kuwaiti bloggers launching a 24 hour no-blogging 
strike protesting alleged surveillance and in solidarity with blocked bloggers
123
. As for 
filtering, a recent example occurred in September 2008, when the Ministry of Communication 
ordered Kuwaiti ISPs to block YouTube, due to content which could insult Muslims
124
. 
However, as of July 2009, YouTube was accessible in Kuwait.  
Still, despite these constraints on Kuwaiti internet users, the Orange Movement activists did 
manage to express their view almost unhindered on the internet during 2006. The one 
exception was the blogger “Ayya” of “The Ultimate”, whose blog was blocked for two days. I 
will elaborate more on this in chapter five. In addition, some activists did experience 
government harassment, as I discuss in chapter six. Lastly, having the freedom to express 
oneself online is one thing, how this freedom is put to practical use may be quite another. 
Thus, some comments on Kuwaiti internet culture are needed.  
4.2.1 Internet culture 
Deborah Wheeler has studied the Internet culture among Kuwaiti youths. Her ethnographic 
study highlights the view of Internet as a social construct, and further “attempts to push 
Internet studies over the borders of Western centrism”125. Her study shows that the Internet is 
important in the youth subculture, and “especially as a tool for leisure and communicating 
with the opposite sex”126. However, in interviews she conducted with Kuwaiti youths, 
political issues were mentioned as well, for instance that the Internet might help Kuwaiti 
women to get the vote
127
. Furthermore, though Wheeler notes that the Internet culture is 
shaped by the user‟s surroundings and the norms in their society, she also points out that “[t]o 
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a degree, students’ cyber relations reveal that the Internet supports decentralization, 
individual empowerment, resilience and self-sufficiency” (…)”128.  
Mark Lynch also points to politically engaged internet users in Kuwait: “(…)In Egypt, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait, for example, bloggers have played a key role in mobilizing contentious 
politics”129. However, he argues that this is a relatively new phenomenon in Kuwait, 
originating with the Orange Movement: “The Kuwaiti case is particularly interesting since 
prior to 2006, most observers had seen the Kuwaiti blogosphere as relatively disengaged 
from politics and marginal to the public realm”130. What made this flip come about will 
naturally be of importance in the following presentation and analysis of the Orange 
Movement. 
4.3 The Orange context 
In the next chapter, I will give a thematic presentation of my findings from the sites` contents, 
that is, both the subjects treated on the sites as well as the features provided. The themes I 
present are those I found to be repeated frequently. I give at least one example of each of the 
elements I highlight, but, unless otherwise is evident from the text, this example is but one of 
many. However, in order to properly contextualize the online content, I start by discussing 
both the issue of the five districts as well as the origins of the Orange Movement in more 
detail. 
 
4.3.1 Why do they want five? 
The issue of the electoral districts has been controversial in Kuwait ever since the late Emir 
Jābir al-ʼAhmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ changed the number from ten to 25 in 1981. According to 
Mary Ann Tétrault, the intention was to “hobble what at the time was a predominantly 
secularist political opposition”131, though one unforeseen consequence was that it paved the 
way for islamists‟ entry to parliament. In addition to the redistricting, a large number of 
Bedouins (badū) – traditional allies of the al-Ṣabāḥ – were given full citizenship, which 
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entails the right to vote and run for office
132
.  
 
However, the above mentioned gerrymandering was not the only reason why reformers 
demanded five districts; vote buying and clientalism played a part as well. With 25 districts in 
such a small country as Kuwait, a relatively low number of votes were needed to win one of 
each district‟s two seats in parliament. According to many OM activists, this in turn set the 
stage for widespread vote buying. For instance, when interviewing the OM leadership I was 
told of one candidate in particular who used to “win easily, used to by 500 votes, 500 KD pr 
vote”. Though this is quite a lot of money, this was not a problem for him, because he would 
get it back “ten times more” after being elected133. Also Tétrault point to vote buying as one 
of the important reasons behind the reform campaign
134
. 
As for clientalism, a well known phenomenon in Kuwait is “”Service members” whose stock 
in trade is to channel favors to constituents in return for votes”135. With larger districts, the 
number of favors to be returned naturally increased sharply; while 1461 votes could secure a 
seat in parliament in the last election with 25 districts, 3636 were needed when the number of 
districts became five. Going back in time, even smaller numbers were needed to succeed 
under the 25. Naturally, being a service MP became very difficult, and after two elections 
with five districts, OM activists hold that their number has decreased substantially
136
.   
In all, the 25 districts were widely seen as a major problem for Kuwait‟s democratic project. 
As journalist Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī told me: “We have so many diseases because of the (25, ed. 
rem.) constituencies”137. Still, not much happened until the 2003 parliament raised the issue, 
though their attempt at redistricting ended in failure. But when a new cabinet was named 
following the January 2006 emiri transition, the issue was high on the agenda, and the cabinet 
formed a committee to “(…) deal with the issue”138. However, even though the committee 
suggested five constituencies, the entire cabinet was not easily persuaded, and launched other 
proposals, confusing the process. Suggestions were put forward for ten districts, for directing 
the issue to the constitutional court and to change the number of seats in parliament, leading 
then Minister of Information Dr. ʼAnas al-Rashīd to resign in protest.  
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On May 15
th, in what later became known to OM activists as “the historical session”139 the 
parliament was set to vote on whether or not to direct the issue to the constitutional court. 
Instead, 29 MPs supporting the five districts rose and left the session, leaving OM activists on 
the gallery in jubilation and the parliament with a lack of quorum. Two days later, the Emir 
dissolved parliament and called for new elections on June 29
th
.  
4.3.2 How it all began 
The Kuwaiti Blogosphere 
As we now know, the number of electoral districts was eventually changed from 25 to five, 
and in this regard the Orange Movement was successful in their campaign. Yet, the campaign 
and the movement did not come into being in a vacuum, and to trace its origins, I start with a 
quick look on the Kuwaiti blogosphere before the OM. I then move on to discuss how the 
issue of the constituencies grew during the spring of 2006, and how the soon-to-be movement 
grew with it. 
Unfortunately, not too much has been written about the Kuwaiti blogosphere as of before 
2006. As mentioned above, Mark Lynch holds that it was predominantly apolitical at the time. 
The Mapping the Arab blogosphere-project has studied the Kuwaiti scene, but at a later time. 
However, the Kuwaiti daily al-Jarīda recently featured an article on the development of 
Kuwaiti blogs. In this papers view, it all started in 2003
140
, when the Kuwaiti blogosphere at 
first came into being. The article attribute much credit for its development to a young blogger 
named Badr al-farīḥ, who it claims founded the first Kuwaiti blog aggregator in 2004; 
http://safat.kuwaitblogs.com. The founding of this site in 2004 is confirmed by 
domaintools.com
141
. Then, however, the article jumps ahead to the Orange Movement of 
2006, perhaps indicating that not much worth mentioning took place in the meantime. 
This view is supported through my interviews as well. According to Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of 
“ma6goog.com”, there were probably between 30 and 50 blogs running before the OM. For 
her part, “Ayya” of “The Ultimate” gave the following description of pre-OM Kuwaiti blogs: 
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(…) bloggers before the beginning of the Orange [M]ovement were total strangers yet became 
close cyber-friends, and that was the beauty of that group. That early group was mostly of the 
intellectual group, no more than a handful, some were university students, others grads, some 
others had artistic hobbies like writing, poetry and drawing. Talented in one field or another, 
mostly youths, but it contained all age groups
142
 
 
In other words, it may seem that the Kuwaiti blogosphere before the OM was limited in size, 
and though an attempt was made to promote and gather the bloggers through the blog 
aggregator, it was not a close knit community. As for thematic content, none of the sources 
above provides much information. However, as mentioned above, Mark Lynch holds that 
these blogs were predominantly apolitical before the summer of 2006. In order to trace how 
the OM emerged from this apolitical, limited and fragmented blogosphere, we need to start 
with some dramatic events of January 2006. 
The Emiri transition 
Whereas the issue of the electoral districts can be traced back, at the very least, to 1981, the 
OM laid its foundations in January 2006, with the Emiri transition. The transition in itself was 
something out of the ordinary, as Tétrault notes: “For the first time in an Arab monarchy, an 
elected body effectively deposed the monarch, and empowered a new one, without anyone 
firing a shot”143. On January 15th, Sheykh Jābir al-ʼAhmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ died, and Sheykh 
Saʻd al-ʻAbdallāh al-Sālim144 succeeded him. However, Sheykh Saʻd was himself very sick, 
and was replaced by then Prime Minister Sheykh Ṣabāḥ al-ʼAhmad al-Jābir on January 29th. 
This was of course no small issue, especially since it in effect meant skipping one branch of 
the family for the other
145
. Even so, these events were kept out of the media. This was before 
Kuwait's 2006 liberalization of the press law, and the five newspapers that existed were, 
according to journalist Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī, controlled by the Government in some way or 
another to the extent that they did not cover these events
146
. Thus, according to the 
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documentary “When the People Spoke”147, many people turned elsewhere for information, 
namely to the “Kuwaitjunior” blog. 
According to Jāsim al-Qāmis of “Kuwaitjunior”, they had “(…) information access to circles 
the newspapers didn’t have access to”148. This view is supported by Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī, as 
well as ʻĀmir al-Zuhayr‟s documentary on the OM mentioned above, in addition to other OM 
activists. This built a readership for the blog, which, according to al-Qaḥṭānī, continued also 
after the succession crisis, and into the issue of the five districts. 
4.3.3 The build-up: the spring of 2006 
As the issue of the constituencies grew during the spring of 2006, many people were 
disappointed that, once again, it seemed to go nowhere. All OM activists I‟ve talked to have 
given this frustration, both with this issue in particular and more general frustration with 
corruption and an ineffective Government, as the main force behind their involvement; 
“Ayya” of “The Ultimate” speaks of being “fed up”, and Jāsim al-Qāmis notes that “(…) 
frustration was always the motivation that we played in order to launch a movement”149, but 
also that “(…)the idea wasn’t to launch a movement as much as just blogging about what’s 
happening”150.  
This was exactly what they did. However, by the end of April, when it became clear that the 
Government probably would not support five constituencies, perhaps not even ten, many 
wanted to do something. On the 25
th
 of April 2006, the authors of “Kuwaitjunior” posted 
questions on whether or not people were ready to do something and take action. In the 36 
comments to the post, readers answered in the affirmative, but also asked about what to do: 
“shabāb, Take the lead, and we will be with you (…)”151. The same day Jāsim al-Qāmis 
launched the campaign site “Kuwait5.org”, on which I will elaborate below, which provided 
contact information for politicians and ministers, asking the readers to lobby them. According 
to al-Qāmis himself, the motivation thought behind “kuwait5.org” was as follows: “I`ve lived 
in the states for some time, I`ve seen how they do their work over there, and basically 
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implemented the things that I`ve learned over there towards formulating a grass root 
movement over here”152.  
Also Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī points to the experience from the US as an important factor, noting 
that these bloggers had experience from the Kuwaiti student union in America, which gave 
them organizational knowledge, a view supported by Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of 
“Ma6goog.com”153. Then, according to “Ayya” of “The Ultimate”, “a wave of new bloggers 
in support of the movement joined the cyber community”154. However, as the cabinet session 
on the issue on the 1
st
 of May ended without a decision, many wanted to take it “to the next 
step”155. At 5:49 AM on the 3rd of May, the user “Tareq” suggested in a comment that they 
should take to the streets, and at 10:12 PM the same day a new post was published on 
“Kuwaitjunior”, entitled “To the streets we go, your presence is very, very, very important”. 
The readers were asked to meet outside the Prime Minister‟s palace on the 5th of May, when 
the cabinet would meet again, to show their support for the five districts. In the comments to 
this post, after Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of “Ma6goog.com” asked if they should wear clothes of 
any particular color, orange was suggested. 
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Figure 3: The user "Tariq" suggests to take to the streets 
 
This was a huge step in the Kuwaiti context – the constitutional court had lifted the ban on 
public gatherings only days before. Furthermore, the organizers were worried that the 
anonymity of the net would discourage people from coming; they did not know who had 
asked them to be there
156
. Still, around two hundred people showed
157
, marking the start of a 
series of demonstrations and events that were ground breaking in Kuwait.  
According to Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī, the OM was created by accident158, whereas Jāsim al-Qāmis 
of “ Kuwaitjunior”, and Khālid al-Faḍḍāla, one of the main organizers, points to a “lot of 
favorable circumstances”159. Evidently, this holds a lot of truth. The Emiri succession built a 
readership for their blog, but their prominent role in covering the events might not have been, 
had the liberalization of the press occurred earlier. The ban on public gatherings was lifted 
with perfect timing to their first rally, though this was not their doing. The frustration with 
corruption, inefficiency and not least the electoral districts grew with good help from the 
                                                 
156
 Al-Qāmis & al-Faḍḍāla (2009) 
157
 Tétrault (2006a). However, the number of participants is difficult to determine, as different sources give 
different figures. I will comment more on this in chapter 5.1. 
158
 Al-Qaḥṭānī(2009) 
159
 Al-Qāmis & al-Faḍḍāla (2009) 
”It is upon us to take to the 
streets. I have a question for all 
of you; are you prepared to take 
to the streets in a peaceful 
demonstration (…)” 
 
44 
 
Government‟s inability to reach a decision, and, not least, they had returned from the US160 
just in time with fresh experiences from political work there. This being said, it was the ability 
of these organizers as well as other activists to capture the opportunity that arose that made 
the OM possible, the circumstances can only be just what they were; favorable.  
Thus, it might be difficult to single out any particular reason as to why the OM came into 
being, and why Kuwaiti bloggers turned political. Rather, a set of different factors seems to 
have played their part. For one thing, even though they were few and unorganized, Kuwaiti 
bloggers were active at the time. And it seems reasonable to believe that they were well aware 
of each other‟s existence, through the blog aggregator. This is further substantiated by the fact 
that they were able to team up on the issue so quickly. Adding the audience brought on by the 
succession crisis, the foundation for a movement was in place.  
For their part, Kuwaiti politicians appear to have played their role perfectly. Against the 
backdrop of what many Kuwaitis perceived as a corrupt and paralyzed political scene, the 
government once again stalled the issue. As Jāsim al-Qāmis put it: 
But the Government kept on postponing and delaying and playing around and changing things, 
so it even fuelled people even more. Like a gathering of some 200 was up to 3000 in say a few 
weeks, that wouldn`t have happened if not the Government antagonized the people in a certain 
way, to even be fuelled even more
161
 
 
This fueled many young Kuwaitis‟ frustration, just at the time when Khālid al-Faḍḍāla and 
Jāsim al-Qāmis returned from the US with fresh organizational experience, influenced by 
what they had seen of American grass root politics: “(…) our minds were really fresh with all 
those ideas”162. As it turned out, this was the mix of events needed for young bloggers to 
organize a campaign.  
Thus, all my sources agree with Mark Lynch‟s view that the Orange Movement marks a 
distinct shift within the Kuwaiti blogosphere. Yet, there is no single answer to my question as 
to what made this flip come about; it was the combination of many events. Interestingly, this 
might help explain another claim made by all my informants; that Kuwait will not witness “a 
new OM” any time soon. Though they all agree that their movement introduced lasting 
                                                 
160
 Not all the authors of “Kuwaitjunior” were back in Kuwait by May 2006, but, by the 5th of May, Jāsim al-
Qāmis and Khaled al-Fadala was. 
161
 Al-Qāmis & al-Faḍḍāla (2009) 
162
 Al-Qāmis & al-Faḍḍāla (2009) 
45 
 
changes in their country, they do not believe it will happen again, pointing out that it was a 
product of its time
163
. I will explore this question in more detail in chapter seven.  
Firstly, however, I move on to discuss the campaign of the Orange Movement and their use of 
the internet. I start by providing a chronological account of the events that took place, and 
then move on to an analysis of the contents of the sites I have studied, arranged thematically 
around the issues repeated most often.  
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5 The orange campaign 
 
5.1 The chain of events 
I have argued repeatedly for the importance of proper contextualization when analyzing 
online findings. Thus, I have presented a discussion of Kuwaiti politics, internet culture, the 
issue of the five constituencies and the background for the Orange Movement. However, 
these online texts notoriously refer to and respond to different events that took place during, 
or as parts of, the campaign. Consequently, these events are important to the understanding of 
the online material, and must be given the proper attention. For this reason, I provide a brief 
survey of the most important events that took place. Yet, some of these events, staged by the 
Orange Movement, in themselves represent innovations in Kuwaiti politics, and deserve more 
consideration. These particular events will be discussed further in chapter 5.3, Offline Action.  
I have used different sources in order to establish the chain of events. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, these sources agree on which events took place when, but not much more. There 
are occasionally different opinions with regards to who organized it, who took part, how 
many took part, why they took part and so on. In such instances, I make these uncertainties 
known to the reader. This aside, the chain of events presented below is confirmed by the blogs 
I have studied, through my interviews, and through the secondary sources I have used
164
.    
The events that lead up to the first demonstration are given in the previous chapter, and it took 
place according to plan on the 5
th
 of May. As already mentioned, this was a big step I Kuwaiti 
politics, and the organizers themselves were by no means confident in its success. Yet, many 
people turned up, and they were duly noticed. According to the organizers, around 200 people 
took part in the demonstration. Though this number is hard to verify, the photographical 
evidence provided by some blogs
165
, as well as the aforementioned documentary on the OM, 
clearly shows that a substantial amount of people were there. Moreover, the pictures show 
people of different ages, old people and young people, as well as families, perhaps indicating 
that the OM managed to mobilize people of different backgrounds, as I will discuss further in 
chapter 5.3. 
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From this point on, the OM moved rapidly. For one thing, they mobilized to many 
Diwāniyyāt, that is, the traditional Kuwaiti gatherings166, arranged by politicians and other 
prominent Kuwaitis who supported their cause. One prominent example occurred on the 6
th
 of 
May, when the “Kuwaitjunior” blog mobilized for such a gathering to be held on the same 
day. The particular Diwāniyya was named “The reconquest of a nation”167, and featured 
prominent speakers such as MP ʼAḥmad al-Saʻadūn, who all agitated support for five 
constituencies. Then, perhaps encouraged by the first demonstration, a new event was 
announced, this time with the intention to keep it going through an entire night. 
The first “Night of will”168 was held on the 14th of May, the first day of what turned out to be a 
very eventful week. Different blogs mobilized for the event, which bore the reoccurring 
slogan “We want Five – for the sake of Kuwait”169. It took place in front the parliament, and 
photos on the blogs give the impression that many people, from children to elderly, took 
part
170
. ʻĀmir al-Zuhayr‟s documentary gives the same impression, and also shows how some 
people stuck to the plan and spent the night outside parliament. In addition, many MPs took 
part, and according to the “Kuwaitjunior” blog, different ideological persuasions were 
represented
171
. Their list of political participants included, among others, ʼAḥmad al-Saʻadūn 
(liberal
172
), Walīd al-Ṭabaṭabāʼī (Salafi173), and ʻAbd l-lāh al-Rūmī (conservative Sunni174). 
According to Muḥammad al-Yūsufī, the organizers took the opportunity to make sure the 
politicians present pledged their support
175
, a support which was tested as soon as the next 
morning. 
On the 15
th
 of May, the Kuwaiti parliament held the session which later came to be called “the 
historical session” within the Orange Movement. As mentioned above, 29 MPs who 
supported the five constituencies left the session and thus prevented a vote on whether or not 
to defer the issue to the constitutional council
176
. The scenes from the gallery may very well 
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be characterized as overwhelming; OM activists stood up jubilation, sung the national 
anthem, and even shouted slogans such as “Down with the government”177. The speaker of 
parliament, Jāsim al-Khurāfī, was unable to restore order, and the session was adjourned.  
Perhaps in order to avoid any further humiliation on part of the government, the parliament 
was surrounded by riot police the next day, when the session was to continue
178
. This did 
hinder the OM from entering the building, and it did enable the parliament to vote on whether 
or not to send the issue to the constitutional council. Yet, even though the government won 
the vote, this was only due to the fact that those who opposed once again were absent
179
. 
Instead, some of these MPs joined the activists, and supported their right to enter “the 
people’s house”180. In the evening, a new demonstration was held outside the parliament. This 
time, the OM claimed 4000 participants
181
. Whether or not this was accurate is hard to 
determine, but the message was clear to the government. Three days later, Friday the 19
th
, the 
movement held a new “Night of will”, this time with the slogan “The night of will 
continues”182. Eventually, the government caved in, and on Sunday the 21st of May 2006, the 
Emir dissolved parliament, and called for new elections on June 29
th183
 . 
It should be noted here that the government might have made another attempt at turning the 
tide in their favor. As mentioned above, it did try to refer the issue of the constituencies to the 
constitutional council, seen by their opponents as an attempt to kill the OM by stalling the 
issue
184. In addition, there was the “Blue Movement”. I have not been able to fully establish 
what the Blue Movement actually was, and who organized it. What is clear, however, is that it 
held at least one gathering, and that it argued for ten rather than five districts
185
. According to 
all my informants, it was set up by the government as an attempt to counter the OM. One 
informant specifically pointed to Sheykh ʼAḥmad al-Fahd, then minister of Energy, as the 
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man behind it
186
. The choice of the color blue might have been hurtful for many OM activists, 
as this color was until then, and for many still is, associated with the women‟s movement187. 
Whatever the truth might have been, the Blue Movement does not seem to have made much 
of an impact. Nevertheless, it caught the attention of the OM at least once, as I will show in 
chapter 5.2.2. 
Leaving the Blue Movement for now, the election campaign dominated the activities of the 
Orange Movement from the 21
st
 of May and onwards. The main concern was, naturally, to 
support candidates who pledged support to five constituencies. Thus, the events announced on 
the blogs were mainly held by different candidates of this persuasion, with the OM mobilizing 
its supporters to their campaign meetings. Still, the activists did take some initiatives of their 
own, among other things a stunt to expose the alleged corruption of parliamentary candidate 
Jamāl al-ʻUmar. However, I will deal with these events under chapter 5.3, as there is no 
indication that they affected the turn of events in the same way as the demonstrations 
mentioned above.  
On the 29
th
 of June, a new parliament was elected, with a majority supporting five 
constituencies. Still, this did not stop the OM from arranging yet another “Night of will” on 
the 7
th
 of July
188
. Then, ten days later, came the end of the Orange Campaign, in more than 
one way. The government, well aware of the will of the majority of the parliament, itself 
proposed five constituencies, and on the 17
th
 of July 2006, the law was passed with 60 of 65 
MPs supporting it
189
. The next day, OM activists met with the PM in an apparent attempt to 
bury the hatchet
190
. However, this was controversial within the movement, and according to 
Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of “Ma6goog.com”, this was the beginning of the end for the Orange 
Movement, as I will discuss in chapter 7.3. Nevertheless, the main aim of the movement was 
met, as the number of electoral districts was reduced to five. Seemingly, the OM was a 
successful popular movement, able to affect Kuwaiti politics substantially. Later, I will 
discuss the effects of this success, both in terms of the new electoral districts as well as the 
example set by the OM. First, however, I turn to the online campaign. In the following, I will 
analyze the online material I have gathered, and discuss its relation to the notion of the public 
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sphere. As already mentioned, the presentation of the online material is organized 
thematically.    
5.2 Online content 
5.2.1 Taking action 
Throughout the sites I have studied, the call for action is repeated notoriously. The campaign 
site of the Orange Movement – “Kuwait5.org” – agitated individual action. On the site, the 
general framework and the main aims of the movement was presented, a demonstration 
announced, it was linked to the “official”191 blog, but the main focus was that you – the reader 
- take action by making your voice heard. The site provided contact information for cabinet 
members, MPs and columnists and urged the reader to convey his or her support for five 
districts to them. Furthermore, the site also provided contact information for newspaper 
editors, again calling upon the reader, this time to thank those supporting five, and to lobby 
those who don`t, or are undecided. 
 
Figure 4: You - the reader - must take action. From the campaignsite “Kuwait5.org”. 
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This call for action was also evident on the blogs. For one thing, all six blogs except one
192
 
announced demonstrations and gatherings taking place. This mobilization often focused on 
the individual; “Kuwaitjunior” repeatedly stated that “your presence is important”193, “The 
Ultimate” stated that she would “see you there”194, and the posters for the demonstrations 
asked “you” to bring five friends, and send SMS to five people195. This continued throughout 
the campaign; “Kuwaitjunior” urged “you” to attend meetings of pro-reform candidates 
during the election campaign
196, whereas “The Ultimate” almost made it an individual duty: 
“Kuwait has done a lot for us; it`s time for us to repay”197. “Kuwaitjunior” could even inform 
the readers that “Kuwait expects a lot from you”198 According to the authors, this was no 
accident, but a well planned strategy to give people ownership to the movement and to the 
work. As Jāsim al-Qāmis put it: “(…) we made sure that there was always an action being 
asked from people, there was always something that is needed from them”199.  
In this regard, it is perhaps natural that the use of blogs seems to have been most important at 
the beginning of their work, when they launched the movement and the issue, discussed 
tactics and promoted rallies, and, not least recruited activists. Though the blogs were used 
continuously throughout the three months, the postings and comments dropped from May 
until July, as the following graphs show:  
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Figure 5: Postings, May until July 2006 
 
Figure 6: Comments, May until July 2006
200
 
 
5.2.2 News and information 
Agitation for the cause, as well as explaining it, was another important feature of the blogs. 
On the 1
st
 of May, “The Ultimate” not only argued for five districts, but also explained why it 
was important. “Kuwaitjunior” addressed the Prime Minister directly when arguing for five 
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districts on the 9
th
 of May, whereas “Kuwaitwall” explained the importance of a constitution – 
and the problems with Kuwait`s – on the 29th of May. On the 19th of May, “Ma6goog.com” 
looked into history, providing a short presentation of Kuwaiti politics in the 80‟s, adding that 
“God willing, there is a lesson in it”. However, these explanations could also concern 
practical details; on the 21
st
 of June “The Ultimate” explained how to vote. 
The blogs were also used to convey news: there were numerous accounts of meetings and 
demonstrations that took place
201
, and news from the election campaign around the country 
were presented
202
. Furthermore, pictures and videos were used actively to broadcast 
speeches
203
, to expose alleged corruption and vote-buying by candidates
204
, and to document 
various events. Two interesting examples were the coverage of the police prohibiting 
demonstrators from entering the Parliament
205
, and the destruction of pro-reform candidates` 
election-posters
206
. I both cases, the pictures posted substantiate the claims made by the 
movement; that they were prevented from entering parliament, and that posters of pro-reform 
candidates were destroyed. Though pictures may be manipulated, the posts appear rather 
credible when their claims are backed up by what is presented as photographical evidence. 
Moreover, the blogs used YouTube in order to broadcast their videos, which allowed for 
different sites to link to the video
207
, as well as to comment on it. In this way, any video 
evidence backing their stories is easily distributed widely, with many access points to the 
same video.  
As for exposing corruption, one interesting example was posted on “The Ultimate” on the 27th 
of June. In two posts, the author claimed to expose that election candidate Marzūq al-Ghānim, 
with the help of his family, falsely registered supporters as living in his constituency, in order 
to boost his votes. The posts were once again backed by photographical evidence. 
Interestingly, as I will discuss below, this very candidate was also endorsed by the OM due to 
his support for five constituencies. Still, publishing these posts turned out to be an unpleasant 
experience for the author of the blog: 
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I published the two posts late at night and next morning my blog was blocked by one of the two 
Net providers (the only two at the time- both owned by the candidate‟s family) in Kuwait, and 
before noon next day the other Net provider blocked it. In Kuwait no Network provider by law 
has the right to block any site without the written approval of the Ministry of Communication, 
and surely there was no time to get the approval at night and in few hours. So it became a 
scandal that other bloggers protested against, and took both of the posts I wrote and published 
them on their own sites, some even translated them. In few hours the articles were circling the 
Net, blogs, forums as well as in the forwarded e-mails and the talk of the Diwaniyas
208
 
 
Though these claims are very difficult to substantiate, it seems the blog was blocked for some 
time. Posts on other blogs refer to this, and to “Kuwaitjunior” publishing some of the material 
while it was down
209
. In the same posts, it is linked to a PDF of the post on the file hosting 
site RapidShare
210
.  
For one thing, this illustrates that the OM did have some trouble with the authorities, all 
though they mostly were able to publish freely online. Moreover, it illustrates how the 
networked public of the OM made any censorship difficult. While the Internet Service 
Providers seemingly could block one blog easily, they could not block the content, that is, 
they could not prevent this content from spreading online. Moreover, this was not the only 
attempt made by the OM to expose corruption, as I will show in chapter 5.3. 
In this way, the bloggers used their opportunity to bring the news as they perceived them, and 
they could convey news ignored by mainstream media. Furthermore, they could respond to 
reports given in mainstream media, as “Kuwaitjunior” does on the 24th of May. In the post, 
they expose what they claim are manipulated photos from a rally for the “Blue Movement”, 
printed in al-Waṭan newspaper. The “Blue Movement” emerged as a reaction to the OM, 
arguing that 10 districts were favorable to five. However, OM activists dismiss the movement 
as something set up by the Government, in order to counter the OM
211
. Whatever the truth, 
the blogs gave the OM a platform in which to counter what they perceived as false reports in 
the traditional media. 
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Figure 7: Exposing manipulated photos in al-Waṭan  Newspaper. 
 
Interestingly, “Kuwaitjunior” went even further and used a language typical of the more 
traditional news outlets when conveying news, with titles such as “breaking news”, and 
referring to “sources close to” so-and-so that “confirm” so-and-so212. Furthermore, the site 
seems to have been able to actually break news; on the 1
st
 of May it reported from a cabinet 
session on the electoral districts before it even ended, and on the ninth of July it presented the 
new cabinet, the day before it became official
213
.  An interesting approach to this news 
coverage is what Atkinson & Coffey refers to as “implied claims of authorship”. That is, how 
rhetorical devices are used to persuade the readers, and how a text “implicitly claims a special 
kind of status – as factual, authoritative, objective (…)”214 and so on. From the examples 
given above, it seems “Kuwaitjunior” often used a language one would recognize from 
newspapers, TV and radio. Thus, the text seems to claim the same status as these media 
traditionally are associated with, namely as factual and objective.  
The blogs were also used to respond to different developments throughout the campaign. For 
instance, when the information minister pressured one broadcaster to stop carrying the 
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programs of private, oppositional satellite stations, “Kuwaitjunior” not only brought the news 
of these events, but gave instructions on how to receive signals from the new broadcaster of 
the stations
215
. Furthermore, as the campaign went from being just a reform campaign to also 
include an election campaign, the strategy was – though after heated debate - adjusted to this 
new reality; pro-reform candidates were endorsed by the movement. For instance, on the 27
th
 
of May, “Kuwaitjunior” presented a rather passionate posting arguing for cooperation 
regardless of any differences other than the position on the electoral districts. In this post, as 
in many others, the text was written in the first person plural: “we wish to cooperate”. 
5.2.3 On behalf of…? 
The use of the first person plural was a common feature in all six blogs I have studied. As for 
“Kuwaitjunior”, the blog repeatedly spoke on behalf of the “Orange Movement”, as well as 
directly to the movement. However, “Kuwaitjunior” also took upon them to speak on behalf 
of the nation. For instance, on the 18
th
 of May they declared that “the Kuwaiti people wants 
five”, and on the 29th of June, they addressed the “sons and daughters of Kuwait”. One 
interpretation of this may be that by doing so, their message gains weight as expressing the 
will of the people. One might even justify this rhetorical device by pointing out that pro-
reform candidates actually won the elections, and changed the electoral districts in accordance 
with the campaigns goal.  
However, there could be another, more important reason behind these words, which is the 
issue of national unity. As mentioned, an ever reoccurring and extremely sensitive theme in 
Kuwaiti politics, as well as in the Emir‟s speeches, is indeed national unity, and every threat 
against this unity must be stopped. In such a situation, it might be unwise for a popular 
movement to divide the people or challenge the system, both with regards to their chances for 
success and in order to avoid trouble with the authorities. It makes sense then, to speak on 
behalf of a united people, to use the slogan “five for the sake of Kuwait”216, to stress that they 
do it for the sake of their country
217
, and to build a wide coalition, even though doing so 
presented the movement with huge difficulties internally. By doing so, the movement could 
hardly be accused of instigating sectarian unrest, or plotting Bedouins against city dwellers. 
“Kuwaitjunior” addressed this directly on the 19th of May, stating that the movement is for all 
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the people and justifying their own actions. Furthermore, when the battle was won, they 
apparently made efforts to bury the hatchet, as I will below. First, however, I turn to the how 
the movement sought to build a community for those involved in their struggle.    
5.2.4 Building a community 
The use of the first person plural may also be an expression of belonging to the movement, to 
a perceived group or even a community. Michael D. Ayers stresses the importance if a 
collective identity for social movements and communities, and points to shared definitions of 
reality and of right and wrong, boundaries marking off the group from others and  
consciousness about itself as a group, as important features of such a collective identity
218
. I 
argue that the Orange Movement`s sites meet these criteria.  
As I have shown, it seems they perceived their campaign as one against corruption, thereby 
enhancing democracy, carried out for the sake of the country. And when the police denied the 
demonstrators access to the parliament, this is unanimously perceived as wrong
219
. In fact, 
“Kuwaitjunior” goes as far as to describe police and government interference as something 
resembling Ṣaddām Ḥussayn`s Iraq, and the perception that the Government`s actions are 
wrong are largely backed up by the 370 comments on this post
220
. Moreover, politicians such 
as Jamāl al-ʻUmar are portrayed as corrupt and common enemies for all who want five 
districts, and their demand for reform is seen as the rightful alternative to the corruption 
represented by these common enemies.  
Furthermore, a clear distinction was made between those who supported five districts and 
those who did not. Both “Kuwaitjunior” and “Ma6goog.com” stated which candidates 
supported five districts, thereby earning “our” support, and those who did not and therefore 
should be fought against. Moreover, the notion of “us” was used notoriously, for instance in 
slogans such as “united we stand”221, as opposed to some undefined “them”. For instance, 
“Kuwaitjunior” wrote that “they” compared the Orange Movement to – among other things – 
Hitler`s followers, but “we” only say that “we want five”222. Still, it does seem that opposing 
“them”, those who do not want five, was easier than defining “us”. On the 2nd of June, a post 
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on “Ma6goog.com” discussed who should be given credit for the reform movement: 
“Kuwaitjunior”, the liberals, or someone else? The post concluded that this is not important, 
and that one should rather focus on working together for five districts. Although this was 
largely supported in the 26 comments to the post, the question of who the OM was, and who 
deserved its support was indeed a difficult one for those involved. 
As I discussed in chapter 4.1, there are some rather harsh ideological differences in Kuwaiti 
politics. For instance, I gave the example earlier of how ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī and Rūlā Dashtī have 
met criticism from islamists after being elected to parliament. In fact, many islamists were 
against women‟s right to vote and run for parliament in the first place223. On the other hand, 
the liberals long campaigned for female suffrage, and as mentioned, the core of the OM 
organizers was placed well within the liberal camp. In fact, two of the main organizers played 
an important part in ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī‟s successful 2009 campaign224. Nevertheless, the OM did 
manage to build an alliance across these ideological differences, as illustrated by their 
demonstration on the 14
th
 of May
225
. Ultimately, this was made possible because this was seen 
as a strategic choice, and the issue of the constituencies was deemed more important than 
anything else: “Whoever is with us is with us, whoever is not with us is against us, is against 
the reform, is against the movement”226. Yet, this decision was not an easy one, and stirred 
much heated debate, as I will discuss below. 
As for the movement‟s consciousness about themselves, Ayers states that “a group becomes 
aware of itself through a series of self-reevaluations of shared experiences”227. In this respect, 
I find the sites‟ use of visual elements interesting. The blogs, in particular “The Ultimate”, 
“Kuwaitvoice”, “Miscellaneous” and “ma6goog.com” made extensive use of videos and 
pictures to document the events that took place. The pictures were typically of smiling youths 
wearing orange clothes, and waving orange flags
228. “Kuwaitvoice” even presented a video of 
dramatic pictures accompanied by even more dramatic music
229
. This allows for participants 
to relive the experience, but is also intended for “those who missed it”230. According to Jāsim 
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al-Qāmis of “Kuwaitjunior”, the making and posting of these videos and pictures were in no 
way organized or planned, “people just went out and did it”231. 
Another interesting aspect is the sense of a community of bloggers which “The Ultimate” 
referred to when speaking about how she met some of her “dear bloggers” she really wanted 
to meet
232, and how a “bunch of free thinkers behind the net” moved the country233. In an 
interview with the author, she also told of how “(…) bloggers before the beginning of the 
Orange Movement were total strangers yet became close cyber-friends”234. Or as Muḥammad 
al-Yūsufī of “Ma6goog.com” expressed it: “We met at the Orange”235. 
5.2.5 Discussions – forming an opinion 
With regards to the public sphere, perhaps the most important feature of the blogs was the 
discussions and comments that took place on the sites. Three blogs in particular stand out in 
terms of number of comments on their postings; “Kuwaitjunior”, “Ma6goog.com” and “The 
Ultimate” with 6565, 1498 and 591 comments respectively, during the three months I have 
studied. Again, it should be noted that not all postings are related to the subject of this paper. 
Moreover, the number of comments does not equal the number of participants in the 
discussion. For instance, of the 68 comments on “Kuwaitjunior” on the last post of the 3rd of 
May, 39 different nicknames were represented. Undoubtedly, some were more active than 
others. Still, the number of comments does indicate the volume of discussion, if not 
determining the number of participants.  
In order to post a comment on the blogs, one needs to have a Google or BlogSpot account, 
which in turn contains a profile. However, the access to this profile may be restricted, 
enabling some anonymity. In addition, nothing prevents a user from providing false 
information in these profiles. Furthermore, the administrator has the possibility to remove 
comments at will, but this will be shown on the comments site
236
. In terms of usage, the 
comments do seem to represent both discussion and more open exchange of opinions. For 
instance, on the 6
th
 of June “Kuwaitjunior” posed the question of whether those who sell or 
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those who buy votes bear the responsibility for such corruption, and readers expressed their 
view in the 33 comments posted
237
.  
Furthermore, expression of support and airing of frustration was done through the comments 
as well, on which “The Ultimate”‟s post on the 1st of June is an interesting example. In the 
post, she denounced a professor at Kuwait University‟s faculty of Sharīʻa for having issued a 
fatwā stating that wives should vote in accordance with their husbands‟ wishes. Although it 
turned out that her version of the story was somewhat incorrect, it is still remarkable that the 
support for her meanings was overwhelming, as many readers expressed their support for her 
opinions and aired their frustration with such religious interpretations as this fatwā.   
But the main point of discussion was strategy, and “Kuwaitjunior” was the place to be. As I 
have shown above, this was evident during the beginning of the OM campaign, and continued 
to be so as the campaign evolved. As mentioned earlier, widening the movement proved 
difficult, especially for the core organizers, all firmly situated within the liberal camp. And 
even though the organizers on “Kuwaitjunior” pushed for cooperation with anybody who 
supported five districts, this was not an easy decision: 
(…) if the politicians were islamists or liberal or whatever they are, it wasn`t our issue. We 
wanted to get in to parliament as many orange people as possible. We went to some islamist 
rallies during the election in support of them. If it was up to us personally, we wouldn`t have 
gone there, because this is not what we support, but it`s because of an issue. Our campaign was 
basically based on that issue and that issue only, and that was what we pushed for. So it wasn`t 
really a concern for us; of what political ideology this person comes from
238
. 
 
On two occasions in particular, this discussion of both who the OM were and what their 
strategy should be became crucial. First, on the 26
th
 of May, “Kuwaitjunior” posted an article 
with the heading “Marzūq al-Ghānim: I support the five districts”, which sparked a heated 
debate over the 108 comments posted. The article told of how activists from the OM waited 
outside the office were candidates registered for the parliamentary election, and asked for 
their view on the five districts. Marzūq al-Ghānim, a nationalist running for the first time in 
this election, pledged his support. The post also call on the readers to show up and show their 
support for Fayṣal al-Muslim, an independent islamist MP running for re-election, who 
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supported five districts as well. Furthermore, a part of the controversy in the comments was a 
video of the activists questioning candidates that was later removed.  
A main point in the discussion was that some readers thought the article to be too positive on 
al-Ghānim, and many also questioned how wise it would be to support an “unproved” 
newcomer. Still others worried about the heated debate itself, and its possible consequences 
for the unity of the movement:  
Please guys, lets continue what have been started on the right way! What have been 
accomplished has never been done before! lets not ruin it now! take it easy guys, and "talk" to 
each other rather than attack!
239
 
 
However, the debate seems far more civilized than such worries should indicate. The authors 
of the blog took part, and defended and explained their views. The tone of the debate was 
respectful, and in the end, one of the fiercest critics of the article thanked the author for his 
clarifications during the debate, and more or less accepted his view, almost leading one‟s 
thoughts to Habermas‟ rational critical discourse.  
 
Figure 8: The user "Um Khilly" thanks the author for his clarifications, and respectfully disagree. 
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However, the discussion on strategy, cooperation and endorsement of candidates was not 
limited to this post only. For instance, in the comments to a post entitled “Cooperation now 
for the sake of nicer differences in the future” on the 27th of May on “Kuwaitjunior”, the 
question of cooperation with for instance islamist MPs was discussed further. Furthermore, 
readers‟ engagement was actively encouraged; in the comments to a post on the 23rd of May, 
readers were asked to participate in three different discussions on three different sites, relating 
to different candidates positions on the electoral districts, and the future program for the 
reform movement.  
 
Figure 9: Readers are encouraged to take part in different discussions. 
 
A second heated discussion took place on the 22
nd
 of July, around a post on “Kuwaitjunior” 
telling of the meeting between OM activists and the Prime Minister, complete with a photo of 
the activists and the PM together, smiling and holding a “nabīhā khamsa” t-shirt. According 
to Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of “Ma6goog.com”, this was “the first hit” the OM took. Over the 
122 comments to the post, many expressed their disappointment with the decision to meet the 
PM, and questioned the right of some to decide to do so, as well as whom the alleged activists 
on the photo were. The authors again participated in the debate, defending their actions, as 
well as the activists on the picture. One of the main points brought forth by the authors was 
that the intention of the OM never was to fight against the royal family or the political system 
Ya Shabāb, we want your orange 
participation: 
- Site for Kuwait list 
- Site for discussion of the 
MPs and their positions  
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of Kuwait, but to reform it. As mentioned earlier, national unity was and is important in 
Kuwait, which may also explain the decision to meet with the PM.  
Both discussions referred to above were difficult yet important strategic discussions for the 
movement. My informants all point to the importance of such discussions, and the 
involvement of the authors of the blog indicate that they deemed it essential to win support 
from the rest of the movement. But even though it seems likely that these discussions 
influenced the strategic choices of the OM, neither of the two examples discussed above led 
directly to a decision being made online. Still, as I have pointed out above, this occurred as 
well. I have given the example of the decision to take to the streets, for which online 
discussion was, at the very least, of the utmost importance. Moreover, there was the choice of 
the color orange to represent the movement, as referred to in chapter 2.4.  
Thus, the movement discussed both general issues, such as strategies of cooperation, and 
specific actions, about which they most likely made decisions. But when specific actions were 
discussed, this did not always lead to a decision and consensus on what to do. One example of 
a discussion in which specific action was suggested but no decision was made, occurred on 
the 24
th
 of May on “Kuwaitjunior”, in the debate on the article in al-Waṭan about the Blue 
Movement. As already mentioned, the post on the “Kuwaitjunior” blog claimed to expose that 
al-Waṭan  used manipulated photos, which exaggerated the strength of the Blue Movement. In 
the 61 comments to the post, different actions of protest against the newspaper were 
suggested. Some favored organizing a boycott of the newspaper by politicians allied with the 
OM
240
, some agitated for a coordinated campaign of cancellations of subscriptions
241
, 
whereas some deemed a more dramatic demonstration covered by other media most 
suitable
242
. However, others argued any such campaign would be counterproductive, and 
would only be used against the OM
243
. Moreover, not all comments expressed faith in the 
claims made in the post, and refused that the photos were manipulated
244
.  
In this debate, as in the others, the authors took part, and explained and defended their view. 
In addition, different participants addressed each other directly, the authors of the blog 
directly, or everyone else in general. Some comments attacked other comments, but once 
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again, others acted as voices of moderation, and called for unity and focus on the all important 
issue of the constituencies: “Please guys save your breath for a worthy cause! your time and 
energy are much more valuable to wasted like this. With my love!”245. 
In all, the discussions that took place mainly on “Kuwaitjunior” were more than just 
exchanges of views or airing of frustration, they were the site of important decisions 
regarding the movement‟s strategy and its definition of itself. As Jāsim al-Qāmis put it: “(…) 
it was what you`d call collective leadership”246. However, as I will show below, some took 
more responsibility in that collective leadership than others. 
5.3 Offline action 
An important feature of the Orange Movement was undoubtedly their use of innovative 
campaign tactics, which gave them attention, and made them a force that could not be 
ignored. For one thing, the many rallies were something new in Kuwait, and drew a lot of 
attention. Furthermore, they evolved.  
For instance, whereas the first demonstration on the 5
th
 of May was a daring step in itself, 
they developed the concept further on the 14
th
 of May, when they arranged the first “Night of 
will”. At this event, speeches were held, people were invited to show their support by planting 
Kuwaiti flags in the ground, and some dedicated activists even spent the night there. By 
constantly renewing their events and notoriously introducing new tactics on the Kuwaiti 
scene, the OM secured lasting attention. According to Jāsim al-Qāmis of “Kuwaitjunior”, this 
was no coincidence: “And then the movement moved on as you`ve seen yaʻni [sic], bas [sic] it 
was always a challenge going foreward; “Ok, what do we do next”? And people always 
expected something. They wanted another rally (…)”247. 
However, not everyone appreciated these public displays of opinion. On the 16
th
 of May, after 
the 15
th
 of May “historical session” in parliament, they once again tried to enter the national 
assembly. This time however, riot police were waiting. According to Khālid al-Faḍḍāla, the 
movement had an “open line” to the police, and cooperated well in order to avoid any 
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disturbances. Still, even though MPs came out to show their support for the demonstrators, 
according to Tétrault, at least one person was beaten by the riot police
248
.  
Another daring new tactic was applied when the organizers tried to expose candidate Jamāl 
al-ʻUmar‟s alleged vote buying. A micro-camera was purchased, and a female activist brought 
it with her to al-ʻUmar‟s campaign staff. However, the camera failed, and she had to use her 
phone camera instead, capturing little more than the voices. Even so, the video was projected 
on to the wall of the local police station, to let the officers – who declined to investigate the 
alleged vote buying – battle with their own conscience249.  
Even though the rallies and other events looked spontaneous and unorganized, according to 
Khālid al-Faḍḍāla and Jāsim al-Qāmis, they were not: 
(…) you won't just all of a sudden have a microphone or speakers for free. People actually paid 
for it. There were someone who actually went and booked the speakers, someone actually went 
and bought the flags, someone went and did the banners, there was an organization behind it. It 
was not public, it was not seen, it blended in, but people sometimes missed that part
250
. 
 
Moreover, some core organizers worked “24 hours” from the headquarters of the National 
democratic Alliance to make it all happen
251
. So even though some participants in the reform 
struggle might not recognize any leaders of the movement, they all benefitted from the 
organizational work being done. Whether or not this was what made the movement successful 
is of course difficult to determine, but it did give them both attention and new followers; in 
their own estimate, the number of participants rose from 200 on the first rally to close to 4000 
on the 14
th
 of May. Undoubtedly, the interplay between online and offline was of great 
importance to the movement. Online, they argued their case, discussed strategy, brought 
news, shared their experiences and so on. And although they seemed to have reached many 
people online, their offline activities made sure their voice was heard regardless of people‟s 
internet connections. 
Moreover, even though a small group did much of the organizational work, the will formation 
as well as strategy decisions were – to a large degree – done online in public, mainly on the 
“Kuwaitjunior” site. Below, I will discuss whether or not this online public constitutes what 
might be termed a public sphere. 
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6 An orange sphere? 
 
In order to apply the notion of the public sphere to the sites I have studied, I will make use of 
Dahlgren‟s three dimensions; the structural, the representational and the interactional. As 
discussed in chapter 3.3, Peter Dahlgren argues that these three dimensions can help identify 
both the publics of any given society, as well as the contributions made by communication 
technology. According to Dahlgren, the structural dimension deals with issues such as access, 
freedom of expression and other institutional features. Then there is the representational 
dimension, which raises questions of fairness, accuracy, pluralism of views and the like. 
Lastly, we have the interactional dimension, which addresses interaction between the citizens 
and the media, as well as between the citizens themselves. In the following, I discuss my 
online findings analyzed above in the light of each of these dimensions.    
6.1 The structural dimension 
Applying Dahlgren‟s three dimensions to my case of study, I start with the structural one. The 
question of access is obviously problematic; as noted earlier, only 31.57% of Kuwait‟s 
population is online. However, this figure includes all foreign workers living in the country. 
Given the difference in living standards, we may assume that the percentage is higher among 
Kuwaiti citizens. Furthermore, the OM was initiated by young people and students, and as 
noted above, Kuwaiti students have free internet access. Moreover, as the movement 
originated on the net, access to the internet could hardly have been an issue for those taking 
part from the beginning.  
In addition, SMS was also used to mobilize for events, and in Kuwait, there are 99.59 mobile 
phone subscriptions per every 100 citizens
252
. This may be part of the reason why so many 
different people joined in on the movements‟ demonstrations; the pictures from these events 
show men and women, old and young, families etc. Still, an SMS is - as is inherent in the 
name – a very short message, it does not allow for much persuasion on an issue. So the people 
that showed up where either already familiar with the issue, or the OM reached them through 
the internet as well.  
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Moreover, even though the internet may not be accessible for everyone, one could hardly say 
that about the public debate in any given country. Or, at the very least, access is not equally 
distributed. But by using the internet, each and everyone can easily convey news and 
opinions, or mobilize for events. When this, as was the case with the OM, is combined with a 
substantial readership, new voices can make themselves heard. This new public may not have 
a wider reach than other, more traditional public spheres, but it may have a different reach, as 
I believe was the case with the OM. Tellingly, the politicians came to the OM, not the other 
way around
253
.  
As for freedom of expression, the OM seems to have been able to publish their opinions 
freely in general. However, as I discussed above, it seems the blog “the Ultimate” was 
blocked for a couple of days after publishing a post on the alleged gerrymandering of a 
candidate in the elections. Still, this did not stop the post from being spread through the other 
blogs, and the file hosting site Rapidshare. Moreover, thanks to the decision of the 
constitutional court, they were able to stage demonstrations as well. Yet, this does not mean 
that the OM did not encounter troubles with the authorities. For one thing, the riot police did 
keep the activists out of parliament on the 16
th
 of May. Secondly, the core organizers told of 
receiving threats from the security services, as well as of phone lines being tapped
254
.  In 
addition, as noted above, the government did try to limit their citizens‟ access to some private 
TV-stations. Still, the movement as a whole was not stopped from expressing their opinion 
neither online nor offline.  
However, when using the internet like the OM did, limits to the freedom of expression may be 
enforced by others than the authorities. As mentioned above, though it was very easy for 
readers to post comments on articles, the owners of the blog had the opportunity to remove 
any comment. On “Kuwaitjunior”, this opportunity was used, though not very extensively. 
From the debate on al-Ghānim‟s embrace of five districts on the 26th of May, 7 out of 108 
comments were removed, whereas 4 out of 122 comments were removed from the 22
nd
 of 
July debate on OM activists meeting with the PM. There may of course be many different 
reasons for the removal of these comments; they may have been insulting, obscene, or, for 
that matter, blasphemous, but it may of course also be that they were too critical. Still, in both 
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cases mentioned above, critique of the organizers was both accepted and debated, allowing 
different views to be expressed. 
6.2 The representational dimension 
This brings us to Dahlgren‟s second dimension, the representational. As shown above, 
different views were expressed in the debates on “Kuwaitjunior”, as well as on other blogs 
such as “The Ultimate” and “Ma6goog.com”. However, most protagonists did undoubtedly 
agree on some main questions; the need for reform, the need to fight corruption, and, for most 
of the participants in the debate; that five electoral districts was the preferred choice. This is 
perhaps not surprising, given that the movement and its public arose on these issues. Still, as 
noted earlier, I do not believe that a public such as this need to include the entire society, the 
main point is for those taking part to be able to discuss, form an opinion and promote the 
issue. Given the number of participants on the OM‟s demonstrations, and not least the success 
of their campaign, it seems they succeeded in lifting their view into the public at large. Even 
though the OM alone hardly was responsible for making the issue public, they did make it 
impossible for anyone to sweep it under the carpet.  
Another point here is the extensive alliance that was built around the issue of the districts 
when the OM embraced anyone from liberals to islamists that supported their cause. Given 
that the core organizers all belong to the liberal camp, this undoubtedly broadened the 
ideological tendencies represented in the movement. Though this sparked some heated debate, 
politicians of other persuasions seem to have taken the opportunity; Tétrault even speaks of 
islamists that “went orange”. Thus, even though it was controversial, and even though the 
movement did not last long after the number of districts was changed, it did manage to 
include different views and different ideological tendencies around this particular issue.   
As for fairness and accuracy, the “Kuwaitjunior” blog seems to have been viewed as a 
credible source for news, for instance with regards to the succession crisis of January 2006, 
and it continued to bring news throughout the campaign. According to Jāsim al-Qāmis, 
conveying unfiltered news and information was “(…) something that we worked on”, adding 
that the OM “had contacts in newspapers, (…) sympathetic to us”255, which they sought to 
utilize. Interestingly, as discussed earlier, “Kuwaitjunior” sometimes used a language usually 
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associated with established newspapers. Though this in itself tells us nothing of the accuracy 
or fairness of the article, it may be convincing for the readers. 
Moreover,  the “see-for-yourself” spirit of blogging – that is, documenting one‟s claims 
through direct links to sources, pictures and so on -  was evident on both this and other OM 
blogs; different events were often documented with pictures, videos or sound clips. 
Furthermore, “Kuwaitjunior” also took upon itself to challenge the accuracy of an established 
media outlet, such as the case with al-Waṭan newspaper. Yet, as these sites were part of a 
campaign, this did of course influence their content. With agitation and mobilization being 
main features, fairness and accuracy becomes difficult to determine. Just as I have no doubt 
that the OM blog authors saw themselves as being both fair and accurate, it would only be 
natural if their opponents deemed it otherwise.  
6.3 The interactional dimension 
Dahlgren‟s last dimension deals with interaction, both between citizens and the media and 
amongst citizens themselves. As shown above, readers repeatedly interacted with the authors 
of “Kuwaitjunior”, but they also interacted with each other. Many comments were addressed 
directly to either one of the authors, or a fellow participant in the debate. This was also true 
for the other blogs, with a good example being the debate on “The Ultimate” on the 1st of 
June, concerning the Fatwā ordering women to vote in accordance with their husband‟s 
wishes.  
As mentioned earlier, the support for the author‟s denunciation of this fatwā was 
overwhelming in the comments. Yet, as I also mentioned above, the author‟s version of the 
incident was somewhat incorrect. One discussant in particular took notice of this, and argued 
that one should take care to stick to the facts
256
. This started a rather heated debate involving 
this discussant, the author, and a third discussant, stretching over several hours and many 
comments.  
Though they never agreed, the blog gave them the opportunity to have the discussion. In 
Kuwait, this is by no means a given possibility. As noted earlier, even liberally oriented MPs 
separate men and women on their campaign rallies, and the sexes are formally segregated in 
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all levels of education. Thus, the blog created a space in which men and women could discuss 
unhindered, without the restrictions of their offline reality. This is not to say that 
communication between the sexes does not occur in Kuwait, naturally, it does. But the online 
public brought on by the OM undoubtedly carried with it a very accessible space for such 
direct communication.   Moreover, when compared to the public of the traditional media such 
as TV and newspapers, blogs offers much easier interaction between the readers, and between 
the readers and the authors. Whereas anyone, at any time, can take part in an online debate, 
and receive an answer instantly, this could hardly be said of a newspaper or a TV show. Thus, 
the OM created an arena for interaction between the media outlets – in this case the blogs – 
and the readers, and between the readers themselves. In line with Dahlgren‟s and Dewey‟s 
point on the nature of a public, the OM readership was more “than just a media audience”257. 
In this chapter, I have sought to apply the notion of the public sphere on my case of study, 
that is; I have discussed my findings in relation to Dahlgren‟s three dimension presented in 
chapter 3.3. However, before I present my conclusions, I will take a quick look beyond the 
Orange Movement. In the following, I briefly discuss the results of the Orange Movements 
campaign; the five constituencies, the OMs impact on Kuwaiti politics, and not least, how the 
Orange Movement came to an end. 
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7 Beyond the Orange Movement 
In order to look beyond the Orange Movement, I will briefly discuss the results it brought. 
However, one could hardly substantiate that any particular change in Kuwaiti politics since 
2006 is a direct result by the OM and the OM alone. Rather, I will look at some key elements 
of the OM and their impact on Kuwaiti society over the last four years. These themes are the 
electoral constituencies, online campaigning, and youth participation in Kuwaiti politics. Yet, 
as the main theme of this thesis is the events of 2006, the discussions will be rather brief. 
Lastly, before my conclusions, I will look at how, and why, the OM ended. 
7.1 Five constituencies 
The most obvious effect of the OM seems to be that the number of electoral districts was 
changed from 25 to five. Whether or not the OM was the factor that caused this change is 
impossible to determine, but their successful mobilization of both the people and many 
politicians undoubtedly made any other option much less likely. However, the problem of 
corruption and ineffective government has not gone away. As Muḥammad al-Yūsufī of 
“Ma6goog.com” told me; “At that time we thought five would solve 95 % of the problems with 
the elections, but in truth, it didn’t”258. Journalist Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī has a more optimistic 
view, stating that on the effect of five districts, “we need more time to know that, (…), but it 
seems good”259, a view supported by Jāsim al-Qāmis and Khālid al-Faḍḍāla260.  
Two elections have been held with the new system, and one of them brought a major change; 
women were elected to parliament for the first time. In the election of May 2009, Salwā al-
Jassār, Rūlā Dashtī, ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī and Maʻṣūma al-Mubārak were elected as members of 
parliament, in the third election since the introduction of female suffrage. As we shall see 
below, at least three of these women made extensive use of the internet in their campaigns. 
Moreover, former OM activists played a leading role in one of the campaigns. Yet, it is fair to 
assume that there were a number of reasons as to why women were finally elected to 
parliament, not just the number of constituencies, and the experience of the orange campaign. 
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In addition, all my informants hold that vote buying and so called “service MPs” is a much 
smaller problem with five constituencies than with 25. As I discussed in 4.3.1, reducing the 
number of electoral districts undeniably makes such practices harder, if not impossible. 
Whereas one could get elected with 1461 votes in the last election with 25 constituencies, 
3636 were needed in the election of 2008
261
. If one were to buy votes, either through money 
or favors, it has become much more difficult with the new electoral districts.  
Still, one might argue that the success of the OM not necessarily depends on the success of 
the new constituencies, but rather that the new constituencies came in place. As I have 
discussed above, this was obviously not the solution preferred by the government. They 
attempted to stall the issue, to find a compromise, and even dissolved parliament. 
Nevertheless, no compromise was made, and it is difficult not to see it as a defeat on part of 
the government, and a victory for the OM. Had the goal of the OM not been achieved, their 
legacy would have been somewhat different; a popular movement which almost made it. Had 
the issue the OM campaigned for not been important and difficult for the government, again, 
its legacy would have been different; a popular movement able to cause a change no one 
opposes. But as things were, the issue was of great importance, and the goal of the OM was 
achieved. Thus, its legacy is that of a successful and influential popular movement in the 
Middle East, which is something out of the ordinary. And as I discuss below, their example 
instituted lasting changes on the Kuwaiti political scene.  
7.2 Online campaigning 
In all likelihood, Kuwaiti politicians would have gone online at some point, regardless of the 
OM. However, as it happened, it seems the Orange Movement introduced the internet as a 
field for political campaigning in Kuwait. According to Jāsim al-Qāmis, online campaigning 
is now widespread in Kuwait, with one example being MP ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī‟s campaign last 
election. It should be noted that Jāsim al-Qāmis himself played an important role in this 
campaign
262
. Nevertheless, as ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī received the second highest number of votes in 
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her district
263
, it does indicate the importance of online campaigning in Kuwait today. 
Moreover, I will provide other examples as well. 
But to start off with ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī‟s campaign, Jāsim al-Qāmis holds that online 
campaigning was of great importance. In fact, so strong was the belief in online campaigning, 
that she even announced her entrance into the electoral race on her YouTube channel
264
. In 
the video, entitled “Dr. ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī announces her entrance into the 2009 elections”, she 
speaks directly to her online audience, explaining that she wanted them to be the first to know 
that she is running for parliament
265
. The front page of her channel bears to color blue, 
assumingly a reference to the women‟s movement266, and includes a link to her campaign site, 
aseel09.com
267
. In addition, all her videos start with a picture of her as well as her campaign 
slogan; “country from anew”268, making them all recognizable as part of her campaign. 
Throughout the campaign, the YouTube channel was used both to spread her own views and 
ideas, as well as to respond to attacks on her candidacy.   
An example of the latter occurred only two weeks before the election, when a video allegedly 
exposing her as unreligious was posted on YouTube. The video, taken by one of her students 
at Kuwait University, was taken without her knowledge, and one can hear her talking on the 
issue of whether or not women should wear the ḥijāb269, and the interpretation that the 
obligation to wear the ḥijāb only applied to the wives of the prophet (PBUH). Not 
surprisingly, this caused uproar. Her first move was to complain to the prosecutor general
270
. 
However, this was not unproblematic, as she then had to defend herself as supporting freedom 
of expression, while at the same time complaining about views expressed about herself.  
She then moved on to face the charges were they originated; online on YouTube. Through her 
YouTube channel, she posted several videos were she explained her views on the situation, 
                                                 
263
 Herb: Kuwait politics database. 
264
 ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī: YouTube channel, video posted on the 30th of March 2009. In this chapter, whenever I refer 
to sites used by politicians in their online campaigning, I give the name of the politician, as well as the name 
of the site in question, or the date any specific video in question. For a complete list of sites and their 
respective URLs, please refer to the list of references, under: “List of websites of Kuwaiti politicians, after 
2006”. 
265
 ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī: YouTube channel, video posted on the 30th of March 2009. 
266
 As mentioned earlier, the women‟s movement in Kuwait have for years used the color blue 
267
 Unfortunately, this page does no longer exist. 
268
 Original quote: ”waṭan min jadīd” 
269
 ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī: YouTube channel, video posted on the 2nd of May 2009 
270
 ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī: YouTube channel, video posted on the 6th of May 2009 
74 
 
and answered questions
271
. In addition, some of her supporters threw themselves into the 
debate, with videos that supported her
272
. Given her success in the election, this seems to have 
been a rather favorable strategy; she utilized the internet to be able to answer her critics, 
perhaps in a more structured way than what is possible in the mass media. Moreover, the 
internet allows for others to help her, as mentioned above. According to Jāsim al-Qāmis, this 
was one of the main goals with the online campaign. They used the same strategy as did the 
OM; give people a chance to contribute, and they will
273
. 
However, as mentioned above, ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī was not the only one who made use of the 
internet in the 2009 election.   The examples of other politicians who made use of sites such 
as YouTube, Facebook and the like during the last election campaign are plentiful. However, 
a study of all the candidates in the last election and their use of the internet is not within the 
scope of this paper. Thus, the examples given below are random, and does not necessarily tell 
the whole story. Nevertheless, they do indicate that politicians of various backgrounds 
deemed online campaigning useful, they may serve as a starting point for further studies into 
Kuwaiti politicians‟ use of the internet since 2006. 
In addition to ʼAsīl al-ʻAwaḍī, two of the other female candidates who were elected had their 
own YouTube channels; Rūlā Dashtī274 and Salwā al-Jassār275. It should be noted here that 
only one video is posted on Rūlā Dashtī‟s channel. Moreover, both channels have links to the 
candidates‟ respective websites276, though Rūlā Dashtī‟s is no longer working. Both these 
channels were, according to DomainTools.com established in March and April of 2008
277
, in 
ample time before the 2009 election.  
Yet, online campaigning was not the domain of female candidates alone. ʼAḥmad al-Saʻadūn, 
the 76 year old nationalist who been a MP since 1975
278
, seemingly makes extensive use of 
the internet in his political work. He has a home page
279, created just after the OM‟s 
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campaign
280
, a YouTube channel
281
, and even a Facebook gorup
282
. Also Marzūq al-Ghānim, 
the controversial MP discussed above, has his own YouTube channel
283
, as well as an official 
site
284
, created during the heat of the orange campaign in 2006
285
.   
Thus, even though this is a random selection of sites and not an exhausting study, it seems 
Kuwaiti politicians from different backgrounds have learned to appreciate the value of online 
campaigning. This is important for more than one reason. For one thing, as these sites all 
followed the OM, or coincided with the OM, one might argue that the Orange Movement 
successfully introduced a new arena for Kuwaiti politics. And as I have argued above, and 
will argue below, this arena is in many ways more accessible than the traditional mass media. 
Through the YouTube channels of these politicians, Kuwaiti internet users can comment on 
the videos, and discuss the respective candidates and their views. In other words, it facilitates 
direct interaction between the politicians and their audience, and amongst the audience. 
Moreover, the status needed to be able to take part in such a debate in the traditional media is 
not a question; all one needs is internet access. 
In addition, Kuwaiti politicians‟ use of the internet is important with regards to the view on 
young Kuwaitis as both voters and political actors. Given that the OM activists who 
introduced online campaigning in Kuwait were mostly young people, and that Kuwaiti 
students have free internet access, one might argue that the online campaigning of politicians 
primarily is aimed at the youth. In this regard, the effort made by the politicians online 
indicates that they view young people as an important segment of the population.  
However, this was not the only contribution to the status of young people on the Kuwaiti 
political scene made by the OM. According to journalist Dāhim al-Qaḥṭānī, “Because of what 
happened with nabīhā khamsa, the parties now trust the young people. (…) Not to join, to 
lead”286. That the PM agreed to meet with the OM certainly supports the view that they made 
themselves relevant on the Kuwaiti political scene. Accordingly, Khālid al-Faḍḍāla is now the 
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leader of the liberal National Democratic Alliance, which even makes clear references to the 
OM in their material
287
.  
In all, the Orange Movement seemingly was a great success, of which many of the 
participants express great pride, and a desire to continue. For instance, in the debate on 
“Kuwaitjunior” following the meeting with the PM, the participant “D” argues that “Ladies 
and gentleman [sic], we just all entered history over the past 2 months.. Now it time to make 
sure we continue to make history as a united collective group we have proven to be”288 Yet, 
it ended together with their main issue, raising the obvious question of why. 
7.3 The fall of the Orange Movement 
All my informants agree that the Orange Movement ended with its main issue, the 
constituencies, in august 2006. For one thing, though the quote by “D” above expresses a 
different view, not all intended for the OM to outlast its issue. Both Jāsim al-Qāmis and 
Khālid al-Faḍḍāla stressed that the OM was all about the issue of the districts. This in turn, as 
I have shown above, greatly influenced their tactics; they built a coalition with little in 
common other than this particular issue. And as we have seen, to build this wide coalition was 
in itself difficult for many involved, dividing those who did have more than the issue in 
common as well. Moreover, as I have discussed earlier, the OM was a result of a set of 
different circumstances working together; the succession crisis, the government‟s handling of 
the issue of the constituencies, the experience from the US and so on. Thus, the momentum 
that drove the movement in the spring and summer of 2006 could not last forever, as the 
circumstances changed. In addition, when the key organizers had no intention of continuing 
the movement, it could hardly be surprising that it ceased to be.    
However, there are issues that might be similar with the districts in terms of gaining wide 
support, such as the legalization of political parties, or an elected rather than an appointed 
government. Yet, no such movement has appeared, and my informants expressed doubts of 
whether it will appear in the near future:  
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(…) in the future I doubt there would be a movement of a similar basis. There might be other 
movements that have different strategies, or different ways of gathering, but it takes a while you 
know, for thing[s] to boil up
289
. 
 
Once again, it comes back to the circumstance, to the particular situation in which such a 
movement would arise. The OM undoubtedly has shown that a popular movement is possible 
in Kuwait, and that it can be able to affect important decisions. But just as the OM arose due 
to many different factors, so will any future movement; things need to “boil up”.  
Nevertheless, I find it hard to believe that this will not happen. As I have shown, the OM has 
introduced some lasting changes in Kuwaiti politics; online campaigning has become the 
standard, and politicians have learned to appreciate young voices. Moreover, many young 
Kuwaitis earned political experience through the OM, and learned that they can make their 
voice heard, and affect the politics of their country. With this in mind, it would be strange 
should not a new movement arise if the right circumstances are in place. Thus, the possibility 
of popular movements is now undeniably a part of Kuwaiti politics.  
Above, I have presented how I have conducted this study, how I gathered my material, and 
the theoretical framework I have analyzed it within. I have contextualized my study, and on 
this basis; presented my online findings, my analysis, and its relation to the notion of the 
public sphere. Moreover, I have looked beyond the OM, and discussed its lasting impact on 
Kuwaiti society. Below, I will draw my conclusions from this study, answering my research 
questions posed in chapter 1.3. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
"The newest computer can merely compound, at speed, the oldest problem in the relations between human 
beings, and in the end the communicator will be confronted with the old problem, of what to say and how to 
say it."   
Bill Gates
290
  
Bill Gates‟ quote above rather precisely articulates the limitations of new forms of 
communication. Even though the internet allows rapid conversations across physical as well 
as non-physical barriers, each and everyone must still have something to say. Yet, this does 
not prevent new forms of communications from being improvements; new technology may 
enable easier, faster and more direct communication, and as such constitute a useful tool in 
terms of democratization. This has been my subject of study, and below, I will sum up my 
findings, and draw my conclusions. 
Firstly, it is clear that the OM made use of the internet for a variety of reasons, and that their 
online presence fulfilled a series of functions. Through their blogs, the OM activists were able 
to agitate their cause, and present their arguments at length. Importantly; they were able to 
present their cause as they perceived it. Regardless of how other media covered the issue of 
the constituencies, the blogs provided a platform in which gave the OM the opportunity to not 
only explain the issue in detail, but also discuss it amongst each other. And when the media 
spoke of the constituencies, or the OM, the blogs provided a platform for them to respond. 
Moreover, the blogs enabled the OM to bring the news as they perceived them, to document 
their own events – both in words and visually – and to expose what they perceived as 
misleading stories in the traditional media. 
The blogs and the campaign site also provided a tool for mobilization and direct action. 
Through the campaign site, each and every Kuwaiti was encouraged to make their voice 
heard, and the site provided all the information needed to do so. Through the blogs, 
demonstrations were announced, and their success shared afterwards. Through films, pictures 
and words, the OM sought to expose corruption as well as what they perceived as 
undemocratic behavior on part of the government. And through these same videos and 
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pictures, as well as some very carefully chosen words, a community were offered the 
activists; a “we” which fought a just cause against “them”. But perhaps most importantly, the 
blogs, and in particular “Kuwaitjunior”, offered an ideal platform for discussions. Through 
the blog posts and their comments field, engaged Kuwaitis discussed the issue of the 
constituencies, the strategy of the OM, the stands of different politicians, the corruption of 
other politicians, and much more. And they did so without any formal constraints with regards 
to age, gender or background.     
Whether or not this would have been possible without the use of the internet, is naturally 
difficult to determine. But the Kuwaiti context provides some helpful clues; in a country were 
education is segregated and even liberal politicians separate men and women at their rallies, it 
seems likely that the internet enabled more direct discussion than would otherwise have been 
possible. Moreover, it is not likely that any other media could have offered the same 
possibilities as the internet. Kuwaiti newspapers or television stations would hardly have 
given the OM all the time and space they needed to present their cause, let alone to agitate 
direct, political action. This does not mean that a reform of the electoral districts could not 
have happened without the internet. But it does suggest that the internet provided an 
important tool when this reform was championed by young Kuwaitis, without the status of 
established politicians. 
Secondly, I hold that the sites used by the OM constituted an online, public sphere. As I have 
argued above, I do not believe that a public sphere needs to encompass the entire society. 
There can be sub-spheres, which are concentrated around special issues, special strata of 
society, special geographic locations and so on, though they must not be formally inaccessible 
for anyone. These may in turn form an opinion and bring it with greater strength into a “larger 
public sphere”, the public debate of the country. 
I argue that the Orange Movement constructed such a sphere through their blogs, their 
campaign site and the YouTube channel. These sites were all connected, both through links 
and users. The sites were used to discuss, agitate, convey news and events, argue, recruit and 
more. Though this movement was built around a particular view on a particular issue, the sites 
were open and could be read and commented upon by everyone with internet access. As I 
have shown, it seems likely that the movement made decisions on these sites which were later 
put in to life. And though there were disagreements, the debates were marked by a respectful 
tone, as well as a desire to move on in spite of any differences, at least during their campaign. 
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Importantly, the movement conveyed news and mediated discussions outside the traditional 
media, and outside the domain of the established politicians.  
However, it should be noted that not everyone makes use of the internet, or have access to the 
internet. But in line with my argument above, I do not believe that a public sphere must 
include all members of any given society, as one would have a hard time finding any public 
doing so. In many ways, it is a question of our basis for comparison. If we identify a public 
sphere on the basis of Habermas‟ normative ideal; the internet may very well fall short. But if 
we compare to the mass mediated public of newspapers and TV, the picture changes. It is 
easier to comment on a blog than to get air time on TV. Therefore, this public may exclude 
previously included parts of society. But it almost certainly includes previously excluded 
parts of society. As such, it – at the very least – changes the access to the public spheres. 
Yet, the internet was not a public sphere; it was a tool mediating their debate, and a place 
locating it. In itself, the internet does not provide communication and debate, it provides a 
technology which enables – and in the case of the OM, eases - communication and debate. 
People still need to log on, to find the relevant sites, to take part in the debate, voice their 
opinion and so on.  These limitations are important to be aware of; the internet will not in 
itself bring democracy to Kuwait, the Middle East or any other part of the world. Though it 
might be an important tool, it is not a sufficient one. First and foremost, it is the actors, the 
people, which are the key actors in any struggle for democracy, and they may or may not 
make use of the internet. In this regard, contextualization is of every importance when 
assessing any possible democratizing effects of the internet. 
As I have shown in this thesis, the OM was a result of many different but coinciding 
circumstances; the Emiri transition, the lift of the ban on public gatherings, the government‟s 
inability to decide on the issue of the constituencies and the decisions of the OM activists to 
take part. Thus, there is no single answer as to why – as Mark Lynch argues - Kuwaiti blogs 
turned political in 2006; it was a series of circumstances. Moreover, another very important 
part of this Kuwaiti context was the relative freedom enjoyed online, that is, a rather limited 
degree of censorship exercised by Kuwaiti authorities. I have shown above that at least one 
blog experienced to blocked due to its content. But in all, the OM activists were able to 
express themselves freely online.  If not, the OM might not have been. Although experienced 
internet users may be able to circumvent censorship, the number of people that took part in 
the OM would hardly have been so. Thus, if the internet is to be an important tool in 
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democratization, the fight against censorship may be just as important as to increase internet 
access.  
Returning to Kuwait and the summer of 2006, the Orange Movement did more than discuss 
online. They seem to have been able to affect their offline reality; the number of electoral 
districts was eventually changed from 25 to five. Even though it would be hard to substantiate 
that this happened due to the OM alone, they certainly made any other outcome much less 
likely. Thus, I believe that the Orange Movement showed that in Kuwait, public opinion can 
be formed and acted upon independent of the state and the political elite. They successfully 
lifted the issue around which they gathered into the Kuwaiti public, and saw it through until 
its implementation as law.  
As it happened, the Orange Movement introduced a new public sphere in Kuwait, using new 
technology and innovative campaign techniques to create new channels for a new audience. 
But well known voices have also since entered this online public; politicians and journalists 
are now blogging, and YouTube videos have become a part of many electoral campaigns. In 
this way, the movement introduced lasting changes to the political scene of Kuwait. In 
addition, they proved successful political campaigning possible for Kuwait‟s younger 
generation, and paved the way for young people into the established political scene. Lastly, 
the OM gave many young Kuwaitis political experience, political expectations and ownership 
to the political process of the country. And the online public space is still there, as a constant 
opportunity for politically engaged Kuwaitis. These are factors that should be considered 
when assessing Kuwait‟s political and democratic future. 
Moreover, it is the hope of this author that this and similar studies might serve as a starting 
point for further investigations into the relationship between internet mediated communication 
and democratization, both in Kuwait and in other countries of the Middle East. Whereas the 
internet proved a successful tool for the Orange Movement, this may not be the case in other 
places. And while this new technology served a series of functions in Kuwait in 2006, it may 
fulfill others in a different country. Through comparisons of contextualized case studies, local 
differences may be established, and structural similarities identified. Thus, the contributions 
made by the internet may be examined without stepping into the over-optimistic technological 
determinism as exemplified by Thomas Carlyle; new forms of communication are nothing 
more than their name indicates, they do not come with pre-fabricated, democratizing contents. 
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Downloaded and saved: 07.04.2010. 
 
ʼAḥmad al-Saʻadūn: 
 
YouTube Channel: 
URL: http://www.youtube.com/user/ZwaiZ 
Downloaded and saved: 07.04.2010. 
It should be noted that it is unclear whether or not this is an official site of ʼAḥmad al-
Saʻadūn. 
 
Home page: 
URL: http://www.ahmedalsadoun.com/ 
Downloaded and saved: 07.04.2010. 
 
Facebook group: 
URL: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2448311061 
Downloaded and saved: 07.04.2010. 
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Appendix I 
 
Questions for interviews, fieldwork in Kuwait 
 
Bloggers/OM: 
What sparked the Orange Movement, and your involvement in it? 
 Did any particular event cause you to take action? 
 Why did you organize around this particular issue? 
 Did the campaign and/or your involvement in it start online or offline? 
 Were you a group that collectively decided to campaign on the issue, or did an interest 
in the issue bring you together to campaign? 
 If not, who decided on the issue, and how did you become involved? 
 
Who is the OM? 
 Did you know your fellow reformers before the campaign started? 
 Is there an inner and outer circle of the OM? 
 If so, who is in the inner, and how was this circle formed and expanded? 
 How well do you know your fellow campaigners? 
 Do you know all online and offline, or is there some you know only online (and 
perhaps not their identity)? 
 What do the OM-campaigners have in common (do you all study, live in the same area 
etc?)? 
 Was men and women working close together within the OM ever an issue? 
 How would you describe the difference between the OM and the “Blue Movement”? 
 
Why and how did you use the internet? 
 For what purposes did you make use of the internet? 
 Which sites did you use in connections to the OM? 
 Did you use al-Ummah? If so, for what purpose, and did you use it before the OM? 
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 Who set up kuwait5.org? 
 Was the internet a preferred medium, or was what you had at hand? 
 Did your involvement in the OM change your net habits, or did you use your 
knowledge and habits to the advantage of the OM? 
 Did you use your own personal computer, or did you go to a internet café? 
 Did you have an agreed-upon strategy? 
 Did you involve yourselves in each other`s writings? 
 If so, how? Through comments, or through directions? And if so, who had the 
authority to give such directions? 
 Who do you believed read your writings? 
 Did you use the internet, or mainly other sources to mobilize? 
 Did people join you through the internet, did they participate offline due to your online 
activety? 
 Did you experience any attempts from the authorities to censor your online activety? 
 Did the involved politicians also involve themselves online? 
 How important would you say the use of blogs, youtube etc was to your campaign? 
 For instance, the videos showing the security forces hindering demonstrators from 
entering the parliament, and the video documenting vote buying, how were the 
reactions to these videos?  
 How did you engage with the traditional media in your coverage of the OM and the 
election campaign? 
 How have your relationship been to the other campaigners since July `06? 
 
How did you build your alliance? 
 The OM obviously managed to unite people and politicians of different ideological, 
sectarian and economic backgrounds. How was this possible? 
 What do you feel about the islamists involvement in the campaign? 
 Did you make specific efforts to build an alliance, or did people jopin in on their own 
initiative? 
 How close did you work with nationalists and liberals such as Basil Al-Rashid and 
Ahmad Al-Saadoun? 
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 Given that you managed to unite around this issue, why don`t the same forces unite 
around, for instance, the demand for a cabinet based on a parliamentary majority, or 
the demand to legalize political parties? 
 Did you experience any attempts from your opponents to either split the alliance, or 
hijack your cause? 
 Why didn`t the OM “resurrect” during this winters political crisis, and the rumors on 
an unconstitutional dissolving of parliament?  
 Has the OM “died”? And if so, why? 
 Do you think such a movement will erupt again? If so, what is needed to spark it?  
 
Journalists/Commentators: 
 How did you hear of the OM? 
 Who was the OM in your eyes? 
 Did you yourself engage in the campaign struggle? 
 Did you read the blogs of the OM, if so, which? 
 Did you ever use them as a source? 
 Did you ever comment on a blog, or participate in a debate on al-Ummah or any other 
forum? 
 Did you ever cite any of the OM following blogs or pages? 
 How do you deem the impact of the OM campaign? 
 In your eyes, was the OM most visible online or offline? 
 How did the traditional media react to the OM`s coverage of their campaign, and of 
the election campaign? 
 When speaking to politicians, did they ever cite blogs, or refer to the OMs campaign 
online or offline? 
 In your view, what built the campaign for 5 districts, and what held them united? 
 Why haven`t such a coalition come together over other issues, such as legalization of 
political parties or a cabinet based on a majority in parliament? 
 Do you think such a movement will erupt again? If so, what is needed to spark it?  
 
Politicians: 
 What was your position on the 5 districts? 
95 
 
 How did you come to this conclusion? 
 Did you participate actively in the campaign for 5 districts, and did you raise the 
issue in your own election campaign? 
 How do you view the so called OM? 
 Did you yourself take part in their rallies, e-mail campaigns, write for them etc? 
 Did you ever meet with the leaders of the OM, and did you discuss strategy? 
 Did you read any of the following blogs/sites? 
 Were you contacted by the OM? 
 How did you react to the OMs writings about you? 
 Did you yourself use the internet in your election campaign? Do you use internet 
today to communicate with the electorate, to blog etc? 
 How did you feel about cooperating with the other politicians in “the 29”, those 
supporting 5 districts? 
 What kept your alliance together? 
 Why haven`t the same alliance, or a similar one, erupted on the issues of legalizing 
political parties and an elected cabinet?  
 How important, in your view, were the popular engagement for the result of the 
campaign? And how important were the campaign of the OM? 
 Do you think such a movement will erupt again? If so, what is needed to spark it?  
 
 
